1 Statistics from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, U.S. Pacific Command, cited in Richard Halloran, "Is Japan a Military Threat to Asia?" Arms Control Today, November 1994. As of Halloran's writing, The U.S. and Russian defense budgets exceeded that of Japan, but Japan's 1995 budget moves it into second place. Additionally, a Reuters report from October 27, 1995, observed that the defense budget would be considered several billion dollars more if military pensions, which do not come under defense outlays in Japan, were added according to the formula accepted by NATO members.

2 Yukio Sato, "The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy." Adelphi Papers. No. 178: 1-41, 1982, p. 2, and James R. Van de Velde, "Article Nine of the Postwar Constitution: Codified Ambiguity." Journal of Northeast Asian Studies. Vol. 6:1, Spring 1987, p. 42.

3 Donald C. Hellman, "Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy Within an American Greenhouse." In The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. 2: The Changing International Context. Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., 345-80. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988., p. 354-55.

4 Kurisu Hiro'omi, Ibitsuna nihonjin (The Distorted Japanese). Tokyo: Horiuchi, 1979, p. 157-8.

5 Susan Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing." In Curtis, Gerald, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

6 There are certain exceptions, such as the recent outcry in Okinawa when US soldiers were accused of raping a Japanese schoolgirl, but as I will discuss later, the general trend is toward acceptance of the policies.

7 Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

8 Mark J. Ramseyer, "The Oil Cartel Cases: Translations and Postscript," 15 Law in Japan: An Annual 57, 1982. Ramseyer also analyzes Japan FTC v. Idemitsu Ksan K.K., the case that impaired price collusion between the bureaucracy and the corporate world.

9 John C. Campbell, "Democracy and Bureaucracy in Japan." In Ishida, Takeshi and Ellis S. Krauss, eds. Democracy in Japan. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989, p. 113.

10 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

11 Mark J. Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth. Japan's Political Marketplace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.

12 Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, "The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism." Yamamura Kozo and Yasuba Yasukichi, eds., The Political Economy of Japan, Vol. I. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987, p. 517. Muramatsu and Krauss argue for their model of "patterned pluralism" taking hold in the 1980s, but the model can be applied in a broader sense to the postwar system as a whole.

13 Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

14 Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 166.

15 Okimoto 1989, pp. 120, 122.

16 Campbell 1989, p. 135. Also see Kent Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan: 1949-1986. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

17 Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, p. 534.

18 Nobutaka Ike, A Theory of Japanese Democracy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, p. 7.

19 Other examples of public opinion siding squarely with the minority include issues such as welfare reform, and the SDPJ's 1990 anti-consumption tax stance, which enabled the SDPJ to win 142 seats in the 1990 Lower House election. See Takabatake Michitoshi, "The July Revolution and Conservative Self-Renewal." Japan Quarterly, October-December 1993.

20 Gerald Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 49-54.

21 Michael Blaker, "The Conservatives in Crisis," in Herbert Passin, ed., A Season of Voting: The Japanese Elections of 1976 and 1977. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1979, p. 18.

22 Ike 1978, p. 59-60.

23 Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, p. 527. This data is taken from a different original source than the Prime Minister's Office surveys used later in this essay, so the two sets of figures may not be directly comparable due to different survey methodologies.

24 Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, p. 19.

25 ibid., p. 142.

26 Steven K. Vogel, "A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy: Views From the Liberal Democratic Party Members," in Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asia Studies, 4 (63). Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law, 1984, pp. 42-43.

27 Keddell 1993, p. 16.

28 For example, see Ishibashi Masahi, Hibuso chritsu ron. ("The Argument for Unarmed Neutrality"). Tokyo: Japan Socialist Party Publication Bureau, 1980.

29 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy." International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, Winter 1983/84.

30 Harrison M. Holland, Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, p. 107.

31 Keddell 1993, p. 24.

32 Yomiuri Shinbun Editorial Staff. A Proposal for the Revision of the Text of the Constitution of Japan. Tokyo, Japan: Yomiuri Shinbun, 1994.

33 John W. Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems." In Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1993, p. 11.

34 Yoshida's change of heart is discussed in detail in Maeda Tetsuo, The Hidden Army: the Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces. Translated by Steven Karpa. Carol Stream, Illinois: edition q, inc., 1995, originally published as Jieitai wa nani o shite kita no ka? Waga kokugun no 40 nen (What Have the Self-Defense Forces Done? Forty Years of Our National Military). Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1990. A timetable of the postwar history of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security relationship can be found in Asahi Shinbun, October 28, 1995, p.13. A more detailed history can be found in Otake Hideo, Saigunbi to nashonarizumu: hoshu, riberaru, shakai minshu shugisha no beikan (Rearmament and Nationalism: The Views of the Conservatives, Liberals, and Social Democrats) Tokyo: Cho Koronsha, 1988.

35 Michio Umegaki, "The Politics of Japanese Defense." In Stephen P. Gibert, ed., Security in Northeast Asia: Approaching the Pacific Century. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988, p. 58-59.

36 Maeda 1995, pp. 74-75

37 Maeda 1995, p. 7.

38 Pharr 1993, p. 240, who is quoting John Dower's 1979 comments.

39 Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, p. 527.

40 Maeda 1995, p. 107-109.

41 Maeda 1995, p. 120.

42 Maeda 1995, Chapter 10, especially p. 107.

43 Laura E. Hein, "Growth Versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Postwar Perspective." In Andrew Gordon, ed. Postwar Japan as History. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1993, p. 114.

44 The JDA analysis of the situation was certainly not as simple as I have presented it here, for given e enmity between China and the Soviet Union, few planners feared attack by a joint "Communist Army." But the implicit threat of Communist attacks from either of the two sources was a major factor in postwar planning, and much of the theoretical defense strategy in terms of repelling short-terms limited attacks was quite similar.

45 The New York Times, October 9, 1994.

46 Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics and Strategy. Washington: Brassey's Inc., 1992, p. 28.

47 Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 40.

48 Keddell 1993, p. 7.

49 Halloran 1994, p. 16. The Japanese have yet to actively defend these sea lanes.

50 Hisahiko Okazaki, A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense. Lanham: University Press of America: Abt Books, 1986, p. 137.

51 Otake 1988, p. 23. For an expression of the measure to which some Japanese feel that the US has led the Japanese military agenda, see Ogawa Kazuhisa, Zai-nichi bei-gun (The American Military, Living in Japan). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985, especially p. 240, where he suggests that because of the American military presence in Japan, Japan may be perceived by some as "America's 51st state."

52 Curtis 1988, p. 176-180. Also see Curtis' "Big Business and Political Influence," in Ezra Vogel, Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-making. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

53 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu (The Prime Minister's Office Secretariat). Jieitai, boei mondai ni kan suru seron chosa. (Public Opinion Survey Regarding the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues), 1992, p. 47. According to Joseph Keddell, "Former JSP Chairman Ishibashi Masahi contends that the government surveys showing that a majority of the populace supports the SDF and security treaty are mere fabrications. The government, he claims, uses such survey results for propaganda reasons in order to forge support for defense plans" (Keddell 1993, p. 24). Although I cannot personally testify as to the veracity of the government surveys, they largely agree with surveys taken by the Asahi Shinbun, generally an opponent of defense spending increases. The methodology and accuracy of the government surveys are beyond the purview of this paper, and I make the assumption that they reflect public opinion accurately enough to be useful.

54 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu 1992, p. 35.

55 Yomiuri Shinbun, July 12, 1988. It is not clear, exactly, where this "safe location" was.

56 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu 1992, p. 9.

57 Anzen Hosho Handobukku (National Security Handbook), published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Keddell 1993, p. 142. These figures are similarly reflected in opinions of defense spending and SDF funding, and there is no significant difference in support of the three branches of the SDF. See Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu, 1992, p. 33 for the trend in opinions regarding how much of the budget should be spent for defense, and p. 26-31 for a breakdown of support by service branch and the postwar trends of this breakdown.

58 Pharr 1993, p. 245. Of course, it is difficult to gauge how strong public opposition to the Vietnam war was, and if public opposition was more intense, Shiina and Sato may have handled the situation much differently.

59 In David T. Mason and Abdul M. Turay, US-Japan Trade Friction: its Impact on Security Cooperation in the Pacific Basin. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991, p. 93.

60 Steven Vogel 1984, p. 56.

61 Chinworth 1992, p. 21.

62The figure is certainly problematic, such as the arbitrary and differing scales of the y-axes. It is not intended to be an accurate guide to the effects of military spending on electoral results, but only a rough outline of such. The trend of direct proportionality of the figures on military spending and election results should in no way be taken to imply a positive effect of military spending. With the possible exception of defense pork-barreling, increased defense spending was unlikely to affect the aggregate of pro-military candidates at the polls.

63 Michael Blaker, Japan at the Polls: The House of Councillors Election of 1974. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1976, p. 145.

64 Steven Vogel 1984, p. 26-27.

65 ibid., p. 31-33. Also see Kanemaru Shin, Do mamoru, nihon no anzen. (How Can Japan Be Defended?). Tokyo: Japan Center for Strategic Studies, 1985, especially pp. 256-257.

66 Steven Vogel 1984, p. 26.

67 ibid., p. 40.

68 The primary interest in the Gulf War for the United States was the United States, but the multinational force made use of cooperative measures rarely seen in Cold War peacekeeping efforts.

69 Kurisu Hiro'omi, "Jieitai kaitai ron" (The Argument for Dismantling the Self-Defense Forces). Shokun (January 1991), p. 76.

70 Reuters, December 25, 1995.

71 Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japanese Strategies in a New World." In Harness the Rising Sun, Nye and Rowe, eds., 1993, p. 213.

72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Toward the Construction of a New International Framework." Policy Blue Book, 1993.

73 Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993, p. 14.

74 Reuters, September 27, 1995.

75 Okazaki 1986, p. 125.

76 For example, the recent flap over Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui speaking at his alma mater, Cornell.

77 MOFA 1993.

78 See Kotani Hidejiro, "Jieitai wa kaigai hahei dekiru ka" (Can the SDF Be Dispatched Overseas?)Jiyo (May 1966), especially p. 27-28.

79 Japan Times Weekly International, October 24, 1994.

80 In Mason and Turay 1991, p. 88.

81 Reuters, November 2, 1995.

82 Jonathan Pollack, "Sources of Instability and Conflict in Northeast Asia." Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 6.

83 Halloran 1994, p. 13.

84 United States Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs. "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region." February 1995, p. 23.

85 MOFA 1993.

86 Masaru Tachibana, "Where is American Policy Driving Japan? The Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis on Domestic Japanese Politics."

US-Japan Program Occasional Paper 92-14. Cambridge, MA: The Center for International Affairs and the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, 1992, p. 14.

87 Okazaki Hisahiko, "Ima koso jizen no senryaku-teki shiko o" (Now is the Time for Independent Strategic Thinking). Bungei Shunju (March 1986), p. 112.

88 Kono Yohei, in a speech delivered at the Japan Press Club, July 28, 1995.

89 ibid.

90 Japan Times Weekly International, October 24, 1994.

91 ibid.

92 Joseph Nye writes: "The United States has formally supported such a position since 1972, but has done little to advance the issue. The European permanent members are more reluctant. Britain and France are resistant to anything that endangers their seats and votes. In addition, a change in the Security Council would involve more than just Japan, for once the UN Charter is open to amendment, many other countries will advance claims. So demands might arise for greater participation that the Security Council, which now has a chance to work more effectively in the post-Cold War era, might be reduced to immobility." In Joseph S. Nye, Susan J. Pharr, and Ezra Vogel, eds., "Contentious Issues and Policy Choices in U.S.-Japan Relations: Proceedings of the Harvard Faculty Study Group on U.S.-Japan Relations, 1990-1992." Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993, p. 116.

93 ibid.

94 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 46.

95 Ezra Vogel, "Japanese-American Relations After the Cold War," in Harness the Rising Sun, Nye and Rowe, eds., 1993, p. 170.

96 Halloran 1994, p. 17.

97 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 45.

98 Maeda 1995, p. 285.

99 Pharr 1993, p. 253.

100 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 48.

101 Tsukamoto Saburo, "Nihon seiji shinyo o do kaifuku suru ka." (How Shall We Recover the Loss of Trust in Japanese Politics?) Cho Kron (May 1991), p. 133.

102 Fukuyama and Oh 1993, p. 15.

103 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 116.

104 Yasuhiro Ueki, "Japan's UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism." In Gerald Curtis, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping With Change. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.

105 MOFA 1993.

106 ibid. The men killed were Atsuhito Nakata, a U.N. volunteer helping to prepare Cambodia for the elections, and Haruyuki Takada, a PKO trooper.

107 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 116.

108 MOFA 1993.

109 ibid.

110 Halloran 1994, p. 14.

111 Japan Times Weekly International, October 3, 1994.

112 For example, see, Mark Bean, Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia: a China-Japan-South Korea Coalition Approach. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1990, especially pp. 131-140. Bean's paradigm is the Cold War world, but for the most part, his analysis stands in the post-Cold War world.

113 "As the international community seeks to build a new security framework in the post-Cold War era, Japan is naturally required to make positive contributions in this field. Such efforts are also extremely important for Japan in terms of ensuring its own security. Particularly important are efforts to ensure security of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to promote international cooperation for arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation and the U.N. Peace-keeping Operations." (MOFA 1993, emphasis mine.)

114 Reuters, November 28, 1995.

115 Halloran 1994, p. 13.

116 Fukuyama and Oh 1993, p. 46-7, who cite various unnamed sources as holding this opinion.

117 The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 32.

118 Halloran 1994, p. 12.

119 Mochizuki 1993, p. 216.

120 The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 32.

121 Halloran 1994, p. 12.

122 Fukuyama and Oh 1993, p. 21.

123 Steven Vogel 1984, p. 29, 52.

124 Yomiuri Shinbun Editorial Staff 1994, p. 66.

125 Asahi Shinbun, November 6, 1990.

126 ibid., February 5, 1991.

127 ibid., June 19, 1991.

128 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel, 1993 p. 46.

129 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu, 1992, p. 2.

130 Sasaki Yoshitaka, "Japan's Undue International Contribution." Japan Quarterly, July-September 1993, p. 259.

131 ibid.

132 Chinworth 1992, p. 8.

133 The New York Times, July 6, 1993.

134 Yoshitaka 1993, p. 264-5.

135 Halloran 1994, p. 13.

136 ibid., p. 13.

137 MOFA 1993.

138 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu 1992, p. 5.

139 ibid., p. 6.

140 ibid., p. 7.

141 ibid., p. 46. See figure 1.

142 ibid., p. 49. Respondents were allowed to select more than one response.

143 This poll, taken in 1992, was right after the UN successes in Kuwait and Cambodia, and before the UN's perceived disaster in Bosnia.

144 Those who responded that the Constitution would prevent war evidently feared that Japan would become involved in a war willingly, rather than being attacked, because the Constitution would probably not be of much defensive use in the unlikely event that China should invade.

145 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu 1992, p. 50-51. Respondents were allowed to select more than one response.

146 Prime Minister's Office Survey, cited in The Ropercenter for Public Opinion Research, The Public Perspective, Vol. 6:5, August-September 1995.

147 Holland 1992, p. 114.

148 Steven K. Vogel, "The Power Behind 'Spin-ons': The Military Implications of Japan's Commercial Technology," in The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 75.

149 Reuters, December 7, 1995.

150 Associated Press, September 30, 1995.

151 Charles Radin, Boston Globe, November 8, 1995.

152 Prime Minister's Office Survey, cited in The Ropercenter 1995.

153 ibid.

154 Naikaku sori daijin kanbo hoshitsu 1992, p. 10.

155 ibid., p. 48.

156 James Auer, in Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 48.

157 Ishihara Shintaro and Morita Akio, "No" to ieru nihon (The Japan That Can Say No). Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1989.

158 Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Translated by Louisa Rubinfein, edited by Eric Gower. Kodansha International: New York, 1994.

159 Fukuyama and Oh, 1993, p. 28.

160 Halloran 1994, p. 17.

161 New York Times, July 2, 1994.

162 Although Murayama took a pro-status quo position on defense spending and PKO participation, one significant military-related departure from the status quo policies of the LDP was Murayama's August 1995 public expression of regret for Japan's actions during World War II, thus far the boldest statement of apology in Japan's postwar history.

163 Japan Times Weekly International, October 3-9, 1994.

164 Associated Press, September 30, 1995.

165 ibid.

166 Reuters, November 2, 1995.

167 Reuters, October 5, 1995.

168 Steven Vogel 1984, p. 54.

169 Reuters, October 27, 1995 and December 25, 1995.

170 Reuters, November 28, 1995.

171 Reuters, December 25, 1995. According to a report on December 14, MOF wanted to keep the cost of Japan's next five-year defense plan below 25 trillion yen ($247 billion). Precise figures on the entire five-year plan were unavailable as of this writing.

172 Reuters, November 28, 1995.

173 Reuters, December 14, 1995.

174 Yomiuri Shinbun, January 9, 1996.

175 US DOD 1995, p. 4. Also see Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, July-August 1995, and for an opposing view of US strategy in East Asia, see Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy" in the same issue of Foreign Affairs.

176 US DOD 1995, p. 23.

177 Green 1995, p. 158.

178 Nye, Pharr, and Vogel 1993, p. 49.

179 US DOD 1995, p. 5.

180 The Economist, December 2, 1995, p. 31. Although a nuclear arms race in East Asia is always a threat, I do not believe that Japan's slow rate of assuming responsibility for its defense is going to trigger a nuclear arms race any time soon.

181 Fukuyama and Oh 1993, p. 46.

182 The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 32.

183 Reuters, December 5, 1995.