どうも、米国の戦略が多方面で変更している。この検討を行う。 Ｆより 石油については、サウジアラビア、カタール、首長国連邦の石油生 産を今までは支援する方向であった。しかし、アルカイダの資金は このアラブ産油国の金持ちたちの喜捨によって賄われていたことが 判明し、米国知識人から、産油国の王制は問題があると指摘された。 それと、イスラムの石油に世界は依存していたが、ロシアの石油や カスピ海の石油に移行するようだ。このため、カスピ海の石油を、 パキスタンにパイプラインで運ぶことになるようだ。カブールには ロシア部隊も存在することになった。 今回のアフガン戦争では、本来石油が値上がりするはずが、値下が りしている。これは変である。米国の作為を感じる。米国の現政権 は石油会社政権とも言える陣容であり、この作為の意味することは イスラムの石油依存からの脱却しかない。サウジへの石油代金受取 額の縮小をおこなった。ロシアのルーブルは石油価格下落に連動し て、値下がりしたため、受取額は変わらない。ロシアと米国の同盟 に発展し、イスラムの石油を破棄することになるのでしょう。 米国のイスラム包囲網形成といしか言えない。これは新十字軍の形 成である。米国に楯突く国をすべて叩く政策でもあり、強い米国志 向を感じる。ブローバックスに対し、力で解決する方向である。 これに連動して、シベリアの天然ガス開発、サハリンから東京まで のパイプライン建設が開始したのも、米国戦略の一部である。 アルカイダを潰しても、アラブ石油国からの喜捨がある限り、また 米国への反感がある限り、米国へのテロ活動は続くため、このアラ ブ資金源の封鎖をしないと、米国としても安心できないのであろう。 イスラム圏と協調外交して、テロに対応しようとしたパウエル国務 長官の政権内での力は、相対的に弱くなっている。ラムズフェルド 国防長官の有無を言わせない力での解決にシフトしている。戦費も ２００億ドル用意したが、まだ１０分の１の２０億ドルしか使用し ていない。このため、次の目標を設定する必要がある。そうしない と、兵器産業、軍事産業へ資金提供ができない。米国の公共事業で あるから、攻撃できる国を探している。勿論、条件は相手から先に 攻撃をしてもらう必要があること。特にイラクであろう。 このため、イスラエルのパレスチナ自治区への攻撃も、事前にラム ズフェルド、チェイニーと相談ができている。ここでパウエルが反 対するのであろうが、できなかったようだ。そして、とうとうパウ エル自体がイラク攻撃を言及した。勿論、アフガン終了後であるが。 パレスチナへの攻撃は、アラブ産油国の反対を引き起こす可能性も あるが、米国の意図がハッキリしているため、動けないでいる。 アラブが動けないため、世界も同じ状態で、米国に抗議できないで いる。しかし、英国の動きは微妙である。ＥＵの雰囲気を米国に伝 えている。このため、ブッシュも今はイラク攻撃に反対している。 北朝鮮が停戦ラインで銃撃を韓国軍に向けて行ったが、これをおお ごとにするかどうかのチェックを北朝鮮は、しているように感じる。 しかし、一歩間違えると、米国軍は公共事業としての敵を探してい る状況なので、アルカイダの基地が北朝鮮にあると言われて、攻撃 される可能性がある。北朝鮮の瀬戸際戦略は危険である。東アジア の不安定さがそこにある。金大中さんの功績ですね。北朝鮮の甘え を許したため、大きな戦争？？を引き起こす可能性がある。 しかし、次のフェーズに移行したことを、日本政府は知っているこ とが必要であろう。どうも、ヨハネの黙示録の世界を進行している ように感じる。今後も米国政権内の動向に要注意が必要であろう。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ POWELL & BUSH DISAGREE OVER NEXT TERROR TARGET by Jim Lobe (Dec. 11, 2001) WASHINGTON (IPS) -- With the Taliban on the run and U.S. allies advancing on all fronts in Afghanistan, Phase II of President George W. Bush's "war on terrorism" -- specifically, the merits of a major military ouster of Iraq's Saddam Hussein -- have re-emerged as Washington's favored topic of speculation. An attack on Baghdad seemed far-fetched when Washington and the Northern Alliance appeared to make little headway in the early days of the war. The sudden collapse of the Taliban has put the question squarely back on the table, much to the discomfort of Washington's Arab and European allies. They sense that anti-Saddam hawks, concentrated among top political appointees in the Pentagon and on Vice President Dick Cheney's staff, now are greatly strengthened compared to Secretary of State Colin Powell, because of a number of factors. First, the clear successes in the military campaign in Afghanistan appear to have bolstered the stature and influence of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Aside from the successes achieved in the military campaign, the way they have been achieved -- apparently, with few U.S. casualties and primarily through air power combined with land offensives by rebel forces advised by U.S. Special Forces -- also has helped the anti-Saddam forces. Powell has long argued that ousting Saddam would require a massive U.S. invasion force. Bush singled out Iraq for the first time during a Nov. 26 news conference. "Saddam Hussein agreed to allow inspectors in his country, and in order to prove to the world he's not developing weapons of mass destruction, he ought to let the inspectors back in," Bush said. "Afghanistan is still just the beginning." Bush's remarks effectively overruled Powell and the Arab and European allies, who had objected to hitting Saddam for want of evidence linking him to Osama bin Laden's as-Qaeda network, let alone the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Until Bush made those remarks, hawks inside and outside the administration had expended an enormous amount of effort at finding such a link. Interestingly, their efforts were initially kept secret from Powell and the State Department. And they never found such a link. Similarly, the hawks tried very hard -- albeit unsuccessfully -- to tie last month's anthrax scare to Saddam's biological weapons programme. Leaders of other nations have spoken up against Bush's plan. Germany Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder warned that "we should be particularly careful about discussion about new targets in the Middle East; more could blow up in our faces there than any of us realize." Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak rushed to agree. Even if Rumsfeld has eclipsed Powell, the secretary of state may turn to such figures as Brent Scowcroft. He was recently appointed to head the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and spoke out publicly in October against new adventurism in Iraq. ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 浦上サイトから転載 ソマリア攻撃攻撃準備 ［要約］１１日付の英「タイムズ」紙は、米当局者が先週末にソマ リア入りし、反政府勢力「ラハンウェイン抵抗軍」（ＲＲＡ）の指 導者らと会談したと報じた 。一方、米「ワシントン・ポスト」紙は 、米情報機関員とみられる５人が１０日、ソマリア西部で反政府勢 力の幹部や隣国エチオピア軍部と接触したと報じた。ソマリア北部 は政府の統治が及ばず、アルカイダの拠点となっているとされる。 [コメント] 私が１週間前に英ＢＢＣ放送で聞いた情報では、アメリ カはソマリアとケニア国境近くにある２ヶ所のアルカイダ．訓練キ ャンプに、すでに航空機を飛ばして偵察活動に入っているそうであ る。さらにこのＣＮＮの情報を重ねると、米軍の空爆のあとで、Ｒ ＡＡ(上記）が地上掃討に入り、エチオピア軍（ケニア軍も含む）が 退路を断つ作戦のようである。（再び、孫子の兵法を思い出そう。 これも包囲戦である）アルカイダと友好関係があると言われていた スーダンとイエメンの両政府は、すでに米国に恭順の意を示してい る。そこで事実上の無政府状態であるソマリアが空爆の第一目標に なったようだ。アメリカはアフガン戦費として２００億ドルを支出 することを議会で決めている。アフガン空爆から今日まで、約２０ 億ドルを使ったという信頼できる数字がある。まだ１８０億ドルが 残っている。ソマリア空爆ではＲＲＡやエチオピアの支払い（軍資 金）を見積もっても、数〜１０億ドル程度の支出で片付くし、また ＲＲＡやエチオピアをソマリアの新たな親米勢力として育成できる 。私は米国のこのソマリア攻撃作戦は決定と見た。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ Powell loses power over Pentagon The military success in Afghanistan has shifted control of US foreign policy back to the hawks, writes Julian Borger Tuesday December 11, 2001 It is not over yet, of course. The hunt for al-Qaida in the Afghan highlands is a difficult, dirty and highly dangerous task for the soldiers involved, but the successes of the campaign so far have already imparted their momentum on the groundwork for action elsewhere. In Afghanistan, as in Kosovo, overwhelming air power appears once again to have been decisive, and the sense of opportunity is tangible among the administration's hawks. This is the moment, they are arguing, to flush out other rogue threats to US national security, in Iraq, and an ever-lengthening list of weak and failed states thought to harbour terrorists - Somalia, Yemen, the Philippines, Indonesia and so on. Barring a disaster in the Afghan endgame, the campaign will serve to bury yet deeper American fears of Vietnam-like quagmires. The extraordinary capability of US technology demonstrated in Desert Storm, Kosovo and now Afghanistan has unshackled a new military self-confidence, held in check for more than a decade by the constraints of the risk-averse Powell doctrine. That stipulated that the US should either go to war with all its might, planes, missiles and armoured divisions - or not at all. The new lessons suggest instead that wars can be won with only a few hundred soldiers equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. The decline of the old doctrine is also a blow to its author, Colin Powell, the secretary of state. His influence and his advocacy of multilateral solutions to US foreign policy challenges had appeared to be on the wane even before September 11, and he was emerging as a lone voice in an instinctively unilateralist administration. After the terrorist attacks, however, he seemed suddenly to be the indispensable man, as Washington scrambled to build coalitions to support its war on terrorism. Now the wheel has turned full circle. The Pentagon triumphed with only a few body bags. Grave warnings from the state department that the war would trigger uprisings across the Islamic world have been proved groundless. The bombing of Afghanistan even continued through Ramadan without much controversy. America's sense of interdependence with the rest of the world, which seemed so profound on September 12, is now an uncomfortable memory in the Bush administration. As the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, pointedly told a gathering of defence policy wonks in Washington: "The mission determines the coalition. The coalition must not determine the mission." To provide just one symptom of the new mood, after hinting at the height of the terrorism crisis that the US might be interested after all in giving some teeth to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, US negotiators last week torpedoed any chance of an agreement on the issue. The chief negotiator at the talks, John Bolton, is an undersecretary of state forced on to the state department by the White House over the protests of his nominal boss, Powell. He is the Pentagon's man in state. Powell does not have a counterweight in the defence department. The policy competition between the state department and the Pentagon is in some ways a structural phenomenon in all administrations, but Powell's rivalry with Rumsfeld and his ideologue deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, stands out for its depth and visibility. John Pike, a strategic analyst at the online intelligence newsletter, GlobalSecurity.com, believes "there's never been this sort of extreme polarisation that will play out over the next couple of months." President Bush has encouraged the fierce debate, listening to both sides before making decisions. By all accounts the role of the national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, is more to crystallise the issues than to add the casting vote. That is more likely to come from the vice-president, Dick Cheney, or Bush himself. Nevertheless, it is significant that in Rice's national security council, there are more voices echoing the Pentagon than empathising with the diplomats at state department. The scales are likely to be tilted even further to the hawks after the departure this month of Bruce Reidel, a Clinton holdover, who has a great deal of knowledge of, and sensitivity towards, the Arab world. The hawks' candidate to replace him is Zalmay Khalizad, an Afghan-American currently involved in the effort to build a post-Taliban Afghan government. If Khalizad is given the Middle East brief, and it appears the fight for the job is still very much on, it will mark a substantial gain for the Pentagon line on the Middle East. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz did not want the US special envoys, General Anthony Zinni and William Burns, to be sent to the region - a decision taken by state and supported by Reidel and consequently Rice. Washington, the Pentagon argued, should not try to exert pressure on Israel, a key ally at a critical moment. Bending over backwards to accommodate Arab opinion would in the long term only undermine the anti-terrorist campaign. In the short term, at least, the upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence has won the argument for them, critically undermining the Zinni-Burns mission at its outset. The White House consequently dropped the traditional appeal to both sides to exercise caution, the blame was focused on Arafat, and nothing said by Washington about the heavy Israeli retaliation. Most significantly of all was the very fact that the Pentagon had a central place at the table in the discussion of Middle East policy, which has traditionally been the preserve of the state department and the national security council. So, while the state-defence, Powell-Rumsfeld, debate continues to push forwards, backwards and sideways with the flow of events as it always has, the weekly shifts in policy mask broader strategic gains by the Pentagon, which is now the dominant department by far. That could have important consequences for Middle East policy, the future of Afghanistan and, of course, the fate of Iraq.