米国の外交戦略転換をみよう。 Ｆより 最近の米国外交を見ると、インドやイラク、イラン、北朝鮮に対す る外交が変化したことが分かる。インドの原子力発電所に今まで禁 止していた米国の設備を売ることで合意して、米国はインドとの友 好関係を築こうとしている。 これはパキスタンとインドが友好関係を取り戻したために、パキン スタン一国との友好関係を構築するしかなかった状態から解放され たためであるが、米国としてはインドとの友好関係は中国牽制に必 要なためでもある。中国も気が付いて、ロシアとの関係を強固にし たり、欧米との関係を強化するためにユノカル石油やＭＧローパー の買収を仕掛けている。しかし、それが益々競争的な関係になって いく可能性があると思うが。 イラクでは、ケリー司令官が来春には部分撤退すると表明した。 勿論、治安が悪くならないなどの条件は着くが、密かに米国の外交 が転換しているようである。 どうも、米国の保守化にも限界点が来たようである。イラクでは、 この１ケ月で米軍４０人の死者が出ている。とうとう、国民もイラ クに攻め込んだことが誤りだったことを認め始めている。ブッシュ のイラク政策に対する米国民の支持は３８％しかない。ブッシュに 対する不満は５６％にもなっている。米国社会がベトナム反戦運動 と同様な状態になってきている。このため、イラクからの撤退に米 軍は傾いている。グアンタナモ海軍基地の収容者の７割送還を出身 国に送還する方針を固めのも、このストリーの延長上にある。 このため、イランの原子力発電所問題が出ているが、イランへの攻 撃を認める雰囲気ではないようである。北朝鮮への攻撃も同様であ る。このため、ＮＰＴに加盟したら、平和利用を認めるとイランに も北朝鮮にも認めた。 しかし、保守から中道に回帰しているわけでもないようである。 無茶無茶な攻撃的な保守が抑制的になってきただけであると思う。 そして、日本も米国と歩調を合わせて、ネオコン的な強硬外交や攻 撃的な保守政策が限界点にあるのだ。日米２国で、頭の良い保守へ 変換する方向に来ている。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 米イラク政策、国民の支持最低の３８％ 米世論調査(ASAHI) 2005年08月06日20時37分 ブッシュ米大統領のイラク政策に対する米国民の支持が、ＡＰ通 信などの実施した最新の世論調査で、過去最低の３８％を記録した 。８月に入って駐留米軍の死者が急増するなか、国民の不満が高ま っていることを示している。 同通信によると、過去数カ月間４０％台を保っていたイラク政策 への支持が、今回初めて３割台に落ち込み、不支持は５９％に上っ た。３日に路上爆弾で民間人通訳を含む計１５人が一度に死亡する など、死者数が急増していることが背景にあるとみられる。 ブッシュ大統領の自信ある姿勢を「高慢」とみる人の割合も１月 の４９％から５６％に増えた。ブッシュ大統領の職務全体に対する 支持も４２％にとどまり、５５％が不支持を表明した。 調査は１日から３日にかけて、全米の成人１０００人を対象に実 施された。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 米、収容者の７割送還へ グアンタナモ海軍基地 【ワシントン５日共同】５日付の米紙ワシントン・ポストによる と、米政府はキューバのグアンタナモ米海軍基地に収容しているテ ロ容疑者５１０人のうち、７割近くを出身国に送還する方針を固め 、アフガニスタン、サウジアラビア、イエメンと交渉を行っている ことが分かった。手始めとして４日には、アフガンに１１０人を引 き渡すことで合意した。 米政府は、現在拘束している５１０人は中程度から高度の危険人 物であり、送還後も釈放しないよう相手国に求めている。同基地で は収容者への虐待問題や、訴追しないまま無期限に拘束しているこ とに対し米国内外から批判が高まっており、これをかわす狙いもあ るものとみられる。 （共同通信） - 8月5日16時58分更新 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ Tectonic shift in foreign policy? http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050802-092828-5402r.htm By Harlan Ullman August 3, 2005 Are we seeing profound and even tectonic shifts in the Bush foreign policy? Or are these really tepid and modest steps by an administration convinced it is on the right track and thus needs no major course corrections? The latest U.S. policy toward India and Iraq suggests the former. The tilt toward India was bold and welcome. Last month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush agreed to Indian purchases of U.S. equipment for nuclear power plant construction and armaments, thus ending a long embargo. As the world's largest democracy with a population of about 1 billion, a huge Muslim contingent and a vast market for U.S. goods and services, this rapprochement makes sense. Given the improvement in Indian-Pakistani relations, the United States can now avoid the either-or condition of choosing between Islamabad and Delhi as a principal partner in South Asia. Some argue that India is an ideal strategic U.S. counterweight to China ― a new version of Richard Nixon's triangular politics, in which Beijing became the means to leverage Moscow and the old Soviet Union. China surely will view the new U.S.-Indian relationship with a degree of suspicion and as a possible warning as it expands its economic muscle and presence with the bid for Unocal oil and its acquisition of British auto manufacturer MG Rover. So the risk is this new relationship turning China into a foe or competitor, either by miscalculation or design. Last week in Baghdad, Gen. George Casey, the Army commander in Iraq, floated the prospect that if security does not worsen in that embattled land, the United States might withdraw some of its troops as early as next spring. With Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in attendance at the press briefing, Gen. Casey's admittedly caveated comments took on added weight. There are good reasons for such a withdrawal to cope with intense pressures in Iraq for an end to the occupation, rising concern at home over the insurgency and an Army under great stress to continue these difficult deployments because of personnel constraints. Thus, despite the president's promise to "stay the course" in Iraq, a potentially profound shift in American policy may be in the wind. On the other hand, too much can be read into both of these cases. Normalizing or improving relations with India is sensible as long as we understand the implications for China. Whether or not the United States reduces its presence in Iraq will depend on many unpredictable and unforeseen events ― Iraq completing a constitution by Aug. 15, electing a new government in keeping with the ambitious schedule and, most importantly, the state of the insurgency. But there are other tectonic prospects. For sometime there has been a drumbeat to deal with Syria. Many in the administration believe that the Iraqi insurgency has its roots in Syria. A military strike or even broader incursion into Syria to disrupt support of the insurgency and possibly to scare or even overthrow President Bashir Assad has been rumored for months. And Iran still heads the list of the Axis of Evil, all the while being too coy by half over its nuclear intentions. In this writer's view, the use of military force in either case would range from the foolish to the catastrophic. But, no doubt it would be tectonic. If the administration is thinking about pursuing bolder and even sweeping policy changes, North Korea is a target of opportunity. The strategy here draws from World War II. Faced with a two-front war in the Atlantic and Pacific, the Allies elected to win first in Europe and to hold in the Pacific before turning our full might against Japan. While the global war on terror is now morphing into a war on extremism, the battlefield remains geographically huge if not global. Because we cannot fight on every front simultaneously, why not move to neutralize any challenges on the Korean peninsula through bold negotiation? There are signs or glimmers that North Korea's leader, Kim Jung Il, is clearly interested in bartering over his nuclear ambitions if only to gain access to economic and financial aid and support. Here China is crucial. In private, Chinese leaders have been positive toward an arrangement in which Beijing would act discretely and powerfully to bring about the nuclear disarmament of the north. If that move proved successful, the quid pro quo would be a new understanding over Taiwan that would neuter the independence issue. The administration would declare that if China attacked Taiwan without provocation, America would still defend the island. But if Taiwan were to declare independence without cause, then "all bets would be off." If all of this could happen, and it may be a bridge too far, that would be truly tectonic. Harlan Ullman is a columnist for The Washington Times. By Harlan Ullman August 3, 2005 Are we seeing profound and even tectonic shifts in the Bush foreign policy? Or are these really tepid and modest steps by an administration convinced it is on the right track and thus needs no major course corrections? The latest U.S. policy toward India and Iraq suggests the former. The tilt toward India was bold and welcome. Last month, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush agreed to Indian purchases of U.S. equipment for nuclear power plant construction and armaments, thus ending a long embargo. As the world's largest democracy with a population of about 1 billion, a huge Muslim contingent and a vast market for U.S. goods and services, this rapprochement makes sense. Given the improvement in Indian-Pakistani relations, the United States can now avoid the either-or condition of choosing between Islamabad and Delhi as a principal partner in South Asia. Some argue that India is an ideal strategic U.S. counterweight to China ― a new version of Richard Nixon's triangular politics, in which Beijing became the means to leverage Moscow and the old Soviet Union. China surely will view the new U.S.-Indian relationship with a degree of suspicion and as a possible warning as it expands its economic muscle and presence with the bid for Unocal oil and its acquisition of British auto manufacturer MG Rover. So the risk is this new relationship turning China into a foe or competitor, either by miscalculation or design. Last week in Baghdad, Gen. George Casey, the Army commander in Iraq, floated the prospect that if security does not worsen in that embattled land, the United States might withdraw some of its troops as early as next spring. With Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in attendance at the press briefing, Gen. Casey's admittedly caveated comments took on added weight. There are good reasons for such a withdrawal to cope with intense pressures in Iraq for an end to the occupation, rising concern at home over the insurgency and an Army under great stress to continue these difficult deployments because of personnel constraints. Thus, despite the president's promise to "stay the course" in Iraq, a potentially profound shift in American policy may be in the wind. On the other hand, too much can be read into both of these cases. Normalizing or improving relations with India is sensible as long as we understand the implications for China. Whether or not the United States reduces its presence in Iraq will depend on many unpredictable and unforeseen events ― Iraq completing a constitution by Aug. 15, electing a new government in keeping with the ambitious schedule and, most importantly, the state of the insurgency. But there are other tectonic prospects. For sometime there has been a drumbeat to deal with Syria. Many in the administration believe that the Iraqi insurgency has its roots in Syria. A military strike or even broader incursion into Syria to disrupt support of the insurgency and possibly to scare or even overthrow President Bashir Assad has been rumored for months. And Iran still heads the list of the Axis of Evil, all the while being too coy by half over its nuclear intentions. In this writer's view, the use of military force in either case would range from the foolish to the catastrophic. But, no doubt it would be tectonic. If the administration is thinking about pursuing bolder and even sweeping policy changes, North Korea is a target of opportunity. The strategy here draws from World War II. Faced with a two-front war in the Atlantic and Pacific, the Allies elected to win first in Europe and to hold in the Pacific before turning our full might against Japan. While the global war on terror is now morphing into a war on extremism, the battlefield remains geographically huge if not global. Because we cannot fight on every front simultaneously, why not move to neutralize any challenges on the Korean peninsula through bold negotiation? There are signs or glimmers that North Korea's leader, Kim Jung Il, is clearly interested in bartering over his nuclear ambitions if only to gain access to economic and financial aid and support. Here China is crucial. In private, Chinese leaders have been positive toward an arrangement in which Beijing would act discretely and powerfully to bring about the nuclear disarmament of the north. If that move proved successful, the quid pro quo would be a new understanding over Taiwan that would neuter the independence issue. The administration would declare that if China attacked Taiwan without provocation, America would still defend the island. But if Taiwan were to declare independence without cause, then "all bets would be off." If all of this could happen, and it may be a bridge too far, that would be truly tectonic. Harlan Ullman is a columnist for The Washington Times.