米中国交回復３０周年記念会議にカーター米元大統領やキッシンジ ャー、ブレジンスキー、スコークロフトなどが出た。この考察。 Ｆより 米国は今後、経済実力が落ちるために覇権力が落ち、世界の警察の 役割を縮小しないと持たない。この時、米国がアジアで頼りにする のは、日本ではなくて中国であるようだ。 今回のソマリア派遣でも、日本は公明党のように武器使用などにク レームを付けて、海上自衛隊の艦艇を送り出さないように圧力を掛 ける。それも与党であり、日本の国益に責任がある存在で、このよ うな政治的な行動をする。このため、公明党は与党であるべきでは ないと支持率でも共産党より少なくなっている。民主党は即座に賛 成している。このため、支持率が上昇している。 日本の船の安全を他国に依頼する世界第２位の経済大国に唖然とす るのは、私だけではなくて、世界のほとんどの国や指導者である。 日本は物資の移動の安全を今までは米国にタダで頼ってきたが、米 国の力が弱り、その穴埋めを依頼されても、日本は関係ないという 対応をすることになっている。これでは国連の安保理で常任理事国 になる資格もない。 この面で中国は、石油の道（シーレーン）でその安全を保証する海 軍基地を多数設置している。このため、日本は昔からシーレーン防 衛と騒いできたが、その防衛を蔑ろにしてきた。そのシーレーンを 完全に抑えているのが中国である。そして、米国の力が弱り、イン ド洋までは米艦艇を送り込めないまでに弱っている。米軍はグアム まで引くことになっている。 このような状況でも日本は公明党の反対で、海上自衛隊の艦艇を送 らない。世界経済での責任を大きな位置にいる日本が果たさない。 それは許されないことである。 米国も日本の政治家の国際センスのなさに辟易している。特にキッ シンジャーは日本が嫌いである。経済に比べて世界に対する責任感 がなさ過ぎである。このため、米国の外交専門家は中国に期待する ことになる。それに答えて、中国は空母２隻を持ち、米国の肩代わ りを行う体制にするという。 日本の商船も守ることになるが、日本が言うことを聞かないと海賊 と結託して、日本船を拿捕することもできる。それを言い換えると 中国の属国化を容認して、中国の保護の下に入ることである。台湾 のようにである。社民党のように中国の属国化になるべきであると いう政党は良いが、普通の日本人は容認できない。 言うことを聞かないすると、海賊はビジネスで、中国の海軍は海賊 と結託することになる。中国海軍も自立するためのビジネスをして いる。大国で義務を果たさない日本のような国の商船を守るはずが ない。 日本が海外の日本船を守る義務から逃れると、それは中国軍が海賊 とのビジネスをやり易くすることになる。日本の安保概念を変革し ないと、ポスト米国時代の日本は中国から毟り取られることになる と見る。 ポスト米国を検討する必要がある。有料版で詳しく検討したい。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 日米欧の「三極委員会」に中印が参加へ 2008.5.10 18:55産経 【ロサンゼルス＝松尾理也】日米欧の知的交流の場として米国の 大富豪デビッド・ロックフェラー氏が創設し、世界の進路にも影響 を与えてきたとされる三極委員会（旧日米欧委員会＝トライラテラ ル・コミッション）が、早ければ来年の東京会合から、中国、イン ドの参加を認める方針を決めた。同委関係者が明らかにした。 同委員会が中印両国に門戸を開くかどうかは、ここ数年懸案だっ た。関係者によると、冷戦終結後の国際情勢の変化の中で、両国が 参加しないままでの会合は意味がなくなりつつあるといった議論や 、同委を解散すべきだといった意見も出ていた。４月末に米ワシン トンで行われた今年度の会合で、両国を加えて継続することを最終 的に決めた。 三極委員会は３年ごとに組織や運営のあり方を見直すのが通例の ため、来年の東京会合までは原則として現行体制が維持される。 中国、インド両国は２０１０年の欧州会合からの参加となる予定だ が、情勢によっては時期を早め、来年からの参加もあり得るという。 同委員会日本事務局を担当する日本国際交流センターの山本正理 事長は産経新聞の取材に対し、現在の世界での中印両国の重要性は 疑いようがないとしつつ、「委員会の規定では、参加国は『先進工 業民主主義国』とされている。とりわけ中国がこの定義に当てはま るかどうかには議論があった」とした。 山本氏は、中国の参加によって従来の日本の主導的立場が変わっ たり、事務局が東京から北京に移るなどの可能性は「考えられない 」と述べる一方、「発足時から日米欧の指導者が結集し、いわれの ないことながら『世界政府』と揶揄（やゆ）されることすら珍しく なかった三極委員会に中国とインドが入ることは、世界史的な転換 点といえるかもしれない」と話している。 ■三極委員会 「日米欧委員会」として１９７３年設立。欧米エ リートによる「ビルダーバーグ会議」に経済成長の著しい日本の受 け入れを打診して断られたため、新しい協議の場を作ろうとするロ ックフェラー氏の意向があったとされる。創設時には宮沢喜一氏（ 後に首相、故人）ら各国のトップエリートが集まった。中欧やメキ シコ、韓国やオーストラリアといった地域諸国も徐々に加わり、 ００年には日本語名称を「三極委員会」に改称した。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 胡錦濤主席、カーター元米大統領らと会談 胡錦濤国家主席は12日午後、中米国交樹立30周年記念活動に出席 するため訪中した米国のカーター元大統領、キッシンジャー元国務 長官、ブレジンスキー元大統領補佐官（国家安全保障問題担当）、 スコークロフト元大統領補佐官（国家安全保障問題担当）らと人民 大会堂で会談した。 胡主席は過去30年の中米関係の実り多い成果と長足の進展を積極 的に評価し、両国民の友情の増進と中米関係の改善と発展に向けた 両国の政府と各界有識者の努力と貢献を高く賞賛した。（編集NA） 「人民網日本語版」2009年1月13日 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ January 13, 2009 The Chance for a New World Order By Henry Kissinger As the new U.S. administration prepares to take office amid grave financial and international crises, it may seem counterintuitive to argue that the very unsettled nature of the international system generates a unique opportunity for creative diplomacy. That opportunity involves a seeming contradiction. On one level, the financial collapse represents a major blow to the standing of the United States. While American political judgments have often proved controversial, the American prescription for a world financial order has generally been unchallenged. Now disillusionment with the United States' management of it is widespread. At the same time, the magnitude of the debacle makes it impossible for the rest of the world to shelter any longer behind American predominance or American failings. Every country will have to reassess its own contribution to the prevailing crisis. Each will seek to make itself independent, to the greatest possible degree, of the conditions that produced the collapse; at the same time, each will be obliged to face the reality that its dilemmas can be mastered only by common action. Even the most affluent countries will confront shrinking resources. Each will have to redefine its national priorities. An international order will emerge if a system of compatible priorities comes into being. It will fragment disastrously if the various priorities cannot be reconciled. The nadir of the existing international financial system coincides with simultaneous political crises around the globe. Never have so many transformations occurred at the same time in so many different parts of the world and been made globally accessible via instantaneous communication. The alternative to a new international order is chaos. The financial and political crises are, in fact, closely related partly because, during the period of economic exuberance, a gap had opened up between the economic and the political organization of the world. The economic world has been globalized. Its institutions have a global reach and have operated by maxims that assumed a self-regulating global market. The financial collapse exposed the mirage. It made evident the absence of global institutions to cushion the shock and to reverse the trend. Inevitably, when the affected publics turned to their national political institutions, these were driven principally by domestic politics, not considerations of world order. Every major country has attempted to solve its immediate problems essentially on its own and to defer common action to a later, less crisis-driven point. So-called rescue packages have emerged on a piecemeal national basis, generally by substituting seemingly unlimited governmental credit for the domestic credit that produced the debacle in the first place - so far without more than stemming incipient panic. International order will not come about either in the political or economic field until there emerge general rules toward which countries can orient themselves. In the end, the political and economic systems can be harmonized in only one of two ways: by creating an international political regulatory system with the same reach as that of the economic world; or by shrinking the economic units to a size manageable by existing political structures, which is likely to lead to a new mercantilism, perhaps of regional units. A new Bretton Woods-kind of global agreement is by far the preferable outcome. America's role in this enterprise will be decisive. Paradoxically, American influence will be great in proportion to the modesty in our conduct; we need to modify the righteousness that has characterized too many American attitudes, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. That seminal event and the subsequent period of nearly uninterrupted global growth induced too many to equate world order with the acceptance of American designs, including our domestic preferences. The result was a certain inherent unilateralism - the standard complaint of European critics - or else an insistent kind of consultation by which nations were invited to prove their fitness to enter the international system by conforming to American prescriptions. Not since the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy half a century ago has a new administration come into office with such a reservoir of expectations. It is unprecedented that all the principal actors on the world stage are avowing their desire to undertake the transformations imposed on them by the world crisis in collaboration with the United States. The extraordinary impact of the president-elect on the imagination of humanity is an important element in shaping a new world order. But it defines an opportunity, not a policy. The ultimate challenge is to shape the common concern of most countries and all major ones regarding the economic crisis, together with a common fear of jihadist terrorism, into a common strategy reinforced by the realization that the new issues like proliferation, energy and climate change permit no national or regional solution. The new administration could make no worse mistake than to rest on its initial popularity. The cooperative mood of the moment needs to be channeled into a grand strategy going beyond the controversies of the recent past. The charge of American unilateralism has some basis in fact; it also has become an alibi for a key European difference with America: that the United States still conducts itself as a national state capable of asking its people for sacrifices for the sake of the future, while Europe, suspended between abandoning its national framework and a yet-to-be-reached political substitute, finds it much harder to defer present benefits. Hence its concentration on soft power. Most Atlantic controversies have been substantive and only marginally procedural; there would have been conflict no matter how intense the consultation. The Atlantic partnership will depend much more on common policies than agreed procedures. The role of China in a new world order is equally crucial. A relationship that started on both sides as essentially a strategic design to constrain a common adversary has evolved over the decades into a pillar of the international system. China made possible the American consumption splurge by buying American debt; America helped the modernization and reform of the Chinese economy by opening its markets to Chinese goods. Both sides overestimated the durability of this arrangement. But while it lasted, it sustained unprecedented global growth. It mitigated as well the concerns over China's role once China emerged in full force as a fellow superpower. A consensus had developed according to which adversarial relations between these pillars of the international system would destroy much that had been achieved and benefit no one. That conviction needs to be preserved and reinforced. Each side of the Pacific needs the cooperation of the other in addressing the consequences of the financial crisis. Now that the global financial collapse has devastated Chinese export markets, China is emphasizing infrastructure development and domestic consumption. It will not be easy to shift gears rapidly, and the Chinese growth rate may fall temporarily below the 7.5 percent that Chinese experts have always defined as the line that challenges political stability. America needs Chinese cooperation to address its current account imbalance and to prevent its exploding deficits from sparking a devastating inflation. What kind of global economic order arises will depend importantly on how China and America deal with each other over the next few years. A frustrated China may take another look at an exclusive regional Asian structure, for which the nucleus already exists in the Asean-plus-three concept. At the same time, if protectionism grows in America or if China comes to be seen as a long-term adversary, a self-fulfilling prophecy may blight the prospects of global order. Such a return to mercantilism and 19th-century diplomacy would divide the world into competing regional units with dangerous long-term consequences. The Sino-American relationship needs to be taken to a new level. The current crisis can be overcome only by developing a sense of common purpose. Such issues as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and the environment demand strengthened political ties between China and the United States. This generation of leaders has the opportunity to shape trans-Pacific relations into a design for a common destiny, much as was done with trans-Atlantic relations in the immediate postwar period - except that the challenges now are more political and economic than military. Such a vision must embrace as well such countries as Japan, Korea, India, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, whether as part of trans-Pacific structures or, in regional arrangements, dealing with special subjects as energy, proliferation and the environment. The complexity of the emerging world requires from America a more historical approach than the insistence that every problem has a final solution expressible in programs with specific time limits not infrequently geared to our political process. We must learn to operate within the attainable and be prepared to pursue ultimate ends by the accumulation of nuance. An international order can be permanent only if its participants have a share not only in building but also in securing it. In this manner, America and its potential partners have a unique opportunity to transform a moment of crisis into a vision of hope. Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Distributed by Tribune Media Services.