The Materialist Interpretation of History and Marx's Critique of Political Economy

TAKAHISA OISHI
Professor of Economics
Takushoku University
Tokyo, Japan

Introduction

In my latest paper[1], I examined the editing problems of "I Feuerbach" of The German Ideology (1845-1846)--hereafter FEUERBACH--. Here I am concerned with the so-called 'materialist interpretation of history', which has been said was formed in FEUERBACH, and its relation to Marx's critique of political economy. I pay special attention on the so-called "sharing problem" between Marx and Engels, i.e., Marx's and Engels' hand, to clarify the identities and differences between the paragraphs written by them. However, we must always bear in mind that Engels' hand does not necessarily mean his thought. The main body of the text was written in Engels' hand because Marx's hand was unintelligible, so-called 'hieroglyphics'. Insertions, supplements and notes can be identified by their hand. Thus, we can sometimes distinguish between their views in FEUERBACH.
Based on the edition I gave in my latest paper, I will start my investigation summarising the 'materialist interpretation of history' to specify the identity between Marx's and Engels' thought (II). Then I shall quote the important insertions, supplements and notes in their hands (III) before examining the differences between Marx's and Engels' views (IV). As no English edition reproduces Marx's and Engels' hands, I believe this is helpful for English readers. In the last chapter (V), I shall investigate the relationship between the 'materialist interpretation of history' and Marx's critique of political economy. In the following, sheet numbers in Engels' hand and page numbers in Marx's on the manuscripts of FEUERBACH are indicated by { } and [ ] respectively.

THE MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY IN "I FEUERBACH"

THE STRUCTURE OF "I FEUERBACH"

According to the edition I gave in the paper, the structure of FEUERBACH is:
1) INTRODUCTION: The first volume of The German Ideology has the aim of uncloaking these sheep (the Young-Hegelian philosophers), who take themselves and are taken for wolves; of how the boasting of these philosophic commentators only mirrors the wretchedness of the real condition in Germany.
2) {1}: The Introduction to FEUERBACH: The purpose of FEUERBACH is to rate the true value of the German philosophic charlatanry and to bring out clearly the pettiness of the whole Young-Hegelian movement by looking at the whole spectacle from a standpoint beyond the frontiers of Germany.
3) {2}: "A PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY": German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never quitted the realm of philosophy. The Old-Hegelians had comprehended everything as soon as it was reduced to an Hegelian logical category. The Young-Hegelians criticised everything by attributing to it religious concepts or by pronouncing it a teleological matter. It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings.
4) {3} and after: Second Chapter ("B Feuerbach")
(1) {3}~{5}: The whole internal structure of a nation itself depends on the stage of development reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse. The structure of the so-called precapitalist societies, i.e., the Asiatic, the ancient, and the feudal modes of production, are analysed as examples.
(2) {6}~{8}: The first premise of history: The production of material life itself which consists of the following five 'elements' or 'aspects': (a) the production of the means of satisfaction, (b) the production of new needs, (c) the production of other men (reproduction), (d) this production of life appears as a natural and social relationship. By social we understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end' ([13]). (e) Man possesses 'consciousness'.
(3) {9}~{11}: The second premise of history is the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the other hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other hand, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity.
(4) {20}~{21}: Supplement to this chapter on the materialist basis of the ruling thought.
(5) {84}~{92}: Three stages in the historical development of private property after 'landed property' in the Middle Ages.

THE MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

From all the observations above, the so-called 'materialist interpretation of history' can be summarised as follows:
The Young-Hegelian philosophers are devoid of premises, but history has its materialist basis, i.e., the production of material life. Thus, we must write history starting from this production of life by social individuals. The relations of production and intercourse form a sum total, i.e., civil society. Consequently, we must explain the form of social organisations, the State, laws or consciousness from the form of civil society which underlies them. Marx states:

Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. . . . Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and intercourse, which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name ([68]).

The first point to be noted here is that the object of Marx's investigation is the social production or the cooperation of several individuals. The social production by social individual has a double relationship, i.e., a natural and a social. They represent the productive forces and the relations of production and commerce. The mode of cooperation is itself a productive force and produces the mode of production corresponding to it. Marx thinks that the productive forces and the production relations are the two sides or abilities of social individuals. In other words, the development of social individuals is expressed in their productive forces and production relations. Property is thought to be the sum total of those relations of production and commerce. For Marx, a definite form of production is equivalent to a definite form of 'the division of labour' and of property.
Secondly, we must understand the above propositions regarding their historical backgrounds. Marx and Engels write that 'to observe this fundamental fact [the production of material life] in all its significance and all its implication and to accord it its due importance' is essential 'in any interpretation of history' ([11]). They do not write that their interpretation is the only interpretation of history. This remark should be understood as a criticism of the Germans, who are devoid of premises to history. On the other hand, we should note their twofold estimation of the French and the English. According to Marx and Engels, the French and the English 'made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis' but 'in an extremely one-sided fashion' ([11]). This implies that mere economic analysis of civil society is not enough, and that a definite form of civil society should be comprehended as a form of production and commerce of individuals. For example, the economic laws must be comprehended from social activities of individuals. In fact, Marx also says 'there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another' ([13]).
Thirdly, the three forms of common property are ideal types of the mode of existence of social individuals. The development from the Asiatic to the feudal form of property is a result of the development in the form of cooperation of individuals, i.e., from natural to social, or from spontaneous to a result of activities of individuals. In the capitalist mode of production, the direct cooperation is mediated by money, the zenith of estrangement of social activity.
Fourthly, for the societies in which the capitalist mode of production has developed, the three precapitalist modes of production are in the past and have declined. Thus, in capitalist countries, the mode of production has developed from Asiatic via ancient to feudal. On the other hand, those modes coexisted in Marx's days, and do today. Thus, Marx and Engels have never written that the European is the only or the necessary line of development. They described the development of the division of labour in the European countries from the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, to the capitalist mode of production and an 'association' of free men in future ({3}, {4}, [42] and thereafter)[2]. This is supported by Marx's task, which was how Germany can 'attain a practice à la hauteur des principes, i.e., a revolution which will raise not only to the official level of the modern nations but to the height of humanity which will be the near future of these nations' (3 MEC 182).
Lastly, however, this does not mean that the preceding modes are equal to the capitalist mode of production from the viewpoint 'the development of social individual'. As is stated in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy (1859): 'This social formation [capitalist formation of society] brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close'[3].
Without doubt, in broad outline, Marx and Engels share a similar interpretation of history. However, a close investigation of their views clarifies the differences between them in fine detail. Let us examine some of them after reproducing the insertions by Marx's and Engels' hands.

INSERTIONS BY MARX AND ENGELS

IMPORTANT INSERTIONS IN MARX'S HAND

In the following, insertions are indicated in single quotation marks and underlines original.

1) It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and 'this mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force"' ({7}b=[13]).
2) For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, 'or a critical critic', and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear in the evening, 'criticise after dinner', just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman 'or critic' ({8}b=[17]).
3) 'Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal interest (in fact the general is the illusory form of communal life), the latter will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to them, and "independent" of them as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general interest"; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interest, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory "general" interest in the form of the State' (a marginal note on {8}b~c=[17]~[18]).
4) 'Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence' (a marginal note on {8}c=[18]).
5) 'This "alienation" (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. For it to become an "intolerable" power, i.e., a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity "propertyless," and produced, at the same time, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which conditions presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development. And on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism could only exists as a local event; (2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained homebred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism' (a marginal note on {8}c=[18]).
6) 'Moreover, the mass of propertyless workers--the utterly precarious position of labour-power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of work itself as a secure source of life--presupposes the world market through competition. The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a 'world-historical' existence. World-historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history (a marginal note on {8}d=[19]).
7) 'The historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusory of ideologists in general, e.g., the illusions of the jurists, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour' ({21}b=[34]).
8) The relation of the productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to 'the occupation or activity' of the individuals (a correction of 'self-activity' in Engels' hand on {89}a=[60]).

IMPORTANT INSERTIONS IN ENGELS' HAND

In the following, Engels' insertions are indicated in single quotation marks and underlines original.

1) 'It is the communal private property which compels the active citizens to remain in this spontaneously derived form of association over against their slave' ({3}c).
2) Where speculation ends--in real life--'there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of the development of men.' . . . 'But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement--the real depiction--of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life process and activity of the individuals of epoch will make evident' ({5}d).
3) 'F[euerbach]'s error is not that he subordinates the flatly obvious, the sensuous appearance to the sensuous reality established by detailed investigation of the sensuous facts, but that he cannot in the last resort cope with the sensuous world except by looking at it with the "eyes", i.e., through the "spectacles", of the philosopher' ({6}a=[8]).
4) 'So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labour and creation, this production, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists, that, were it interrupted only a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of men and his own perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing. Of course, in all this priority of external nature remains unassailed, and all this has no application to the original men produced by generatio aequivoca, but this differentiation has meaning only insofar as man is considered to be distinct from nature. For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means that nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin) and which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach' ({6}b~c= [9]~[10]).
5) 'Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product' ({8}b~c=[17]~[18]).
6) 'And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community the latter takes an independent form of the State, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration . . . and especially, as we shall enlarge upon later, on the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others. It follows from this that all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc., etc., are merely illusory forms -- altogether the general interest is the illusory of common interests -- in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another. . . . Further, it follows that every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself, must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do' (a marginal note on {8}b=[17]. Italics are Marx's insertion).
7) This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e., civil society in its various stage), 'as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State', to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc. etc. and trace their origins and growth from the basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another) ({10}c=[24]. Italics are Marx's insertion).
8) In the whole conception of history up to the present this real basis of history has either been totally neglected or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history. 'History must, therefore, always be written according to an extraneous standard; the real production of life seems to be primeval history, while the truly historical appears to be separated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial. With this the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created' ({10}c=[25]).
9) This whole conception of history, together with its dissolution and the scruples and qualms resulting from it, is a purely national affair of the Germans and has merely local interest for Germany, as for instance the important question which has been under discussion in recent times: how exactly one "passes from the realm of God to the realm of Man"--as if this "realm of God" had ever existed anywhere save in the imagination, and the learned gentlemen, without being aware of it, were not constantly living in the "realm of Man" to which they are now seeking the way; 'and as if the learned pastime (for it is nothing more) of explaining the mystery of this theoretical bubble-blowing did not on the contrary lie in demonstrating its origin in actual earthy relations. . . . The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the removal of these notions from the consciousness of men, will, as we have already said, be effected by altered circumstances, not by theoretical deductions. For the mass of men, i.e., the proletariat, these theoretical notions do not exist and hence do not require to be dissolved, and if this mass ever had any theoretical notions, e.g., religion, these have now long been dissolved by circumstances' ({10}d~{11}a= [26]~[27], Italics Marx's insertions).
10) 'It is also clear from these arguments . . . , and do not realise that these adverse conditions are spirit of their spirit' (A marginal notes on {11}b~c=[28]~[29]. Almost all the text of {11}b=[28] and all that of {11}c=[29] are crossed out).
11) 'Thus money implies that all previous intercourse was only intercourse of individuals under particular conditions, not of individuals as individuals. These conditions are reduced to two: accumulated labour or private property, and actual labour. If both or one of these ceases, then intercourse comes to a standstill. The modern economists themselves, e.g. Sismondi, Cherbuliez, etc., oppose "association of individuals" to "association of capital"' ({90}a~c=[64]~[65]).
12) The division of labour implies from the outset the division of the conditions of labour, of tools and materials, 'and thus the splitting-up of accumulated capital among different owners, and thus, also, the division between capital and labour, and the different forms of property itself' ({90}a~c=[64]~[65]).
13) While in the earlier period self-activity and the production of material life were separated, in that they devolved on different persons, and while, on account of the narrowness of the individuals themselves, the production of material life was considered as a subordinate mode of self-activity, they now diverge to such an extent that altogether material life appears as the end, and that which produces this material life, labour '(which is now the only possible but, as we see, negative form of self-activity)', as the means ({90}c=[66]).
14) 'In the case of the ancient people, since several tribes live together in one town, the tribal property appears as State property, and the right of the individual to it as mere "possession" which, however, like tribal property as a whole, is confined to landed property only. Real private property began with the ancient, as with modern nations, with movable property.--(Slavery and Community) (dominium ex jure Quiritum )' ({91}b=[69]).

THE DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN
MARX AND ENGELS

THE PRECAPITALIST MODES OF PRODUCTION

Firstly, the Asiatic mode of property is considered in {3}b, while it is not in [68] and thereafter.
Secondly, in {3}b the 'ancient mode of property' is defined with 'State property and private property' while in [69] with 'State property' only. [69} says:

In the case of the ancient peoples, . . . the tribal property appears as State property, and the right of the individuals to it as mere "possession" which . . . is confined to landed property only ([69]).

The former definition is almost the same as that in 'formations which precede capitalist societies' in Marx's Grundrisse (1857-58) and is undoubtedly Marx's view. Thus, the latter, which differs a little from the former, is probably Engels' view. With regard to this, {3}b says that the ancient mode of property 'proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest', while [68] says that this property is 'determined . . . chiefly by war'. The latter proposition appears at first sight to contradict [62]~[63], a supplement on the role of violence, war and robbery, etc.; but the first proposition itself is an insertion by Engels. Therefore there is no great difference between Marx and Engels on this point.
Thirdly, in {3}d 'feudal property' is defined as 'landed property' in the country and 'corporative property' in the town, whilst [69] says that the former developed into the latter. According to {3}, country and town are united in the Asiatic and the history of the ancient property is the history of towns, thus the antagonism between country and town begins, necessarily and essentially, from the feudal property[4]. On the other hand, [41] asserts that 'The antagonism between town and country . . . runs through the whole history of civilisation to the present day', but lacks the logic to comprehend (begreifen ) the antagonism[5].

THE DIVISION OF LABOUR AND PROPERTY

In FEUERBACH, 'division of labour' is explained four times as being essentially an identical expression of property, but these explanations can be divided into two types:
1) division of labour = the relations of production and intercourse = property relations: {3}b and [52]
2) division of labour = the unequal distribution, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of labour and its products = private property: [16]~[17] and [64]~[65]
In broad outline, both coincide but the division of labour does not necessarily result in private property, as in the Asiatic. The latter (2)) interprets private property mainly as the problem of distribution, i.e. to whom the products and the means of production belong. However, the former (1)) property as the relations of production. The latter does not contain the Asiatic common property, while the former does. With regard to this, it is also noteworthy that Marx grasped the essence of private property as 'the power to command labour and products'[6] of other man in The Economic Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)--hereafter EPM--by rereading and reinterpreting Smith's concept of'command'; but the text in [17] incorrectly quotes this definition of private property, saying:

This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others' ([17]).

This difference between Marx and Engels, which I have already examined[7], runs through to their last works. The point is that Engels does not appreciate the concept 'the relations of production' and cannot understand Marx's concept 'property' as the sum total of the relations. It should be noted that the abolition of 'division of labour' or of 'labour' means the abolition of their capitalist form, but does not mean that there is no social division of labour or productive-activity in the future.

THE TWO ABILITIES OF THE SOCIAL INDIVIDUAL

In his letter to Annenkov (dated 28 December 1846), Marx remarks that 'the social history of man is never anything else than the history of his individual development, whether he is conscious of this or not[8]. In Grundrisse he states that 'Forces of production and social relations--two different sides of the development of the social individual'[9]. Compared to these views, the statement in [61] that the history of the conditions of production is 'the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves' seems to be one-sided. Engels does not use the term 'estranged labour' as often as Marx[10], because he does not comprehend social laws from the social activities of individuals, as his view on economic laws shows[11]. This is not his strong point but his weak point.
Bagaturija distinguishes three formations in the manuscripts of FEUERBACH and asserts that Marx and Engels gradually gave up the term 'estrangement' as time passed[12]. It is quite true that the first part of the "big bunch" ([8] to [35]) was written first, then the second part of the bunch and then the "small bunch." It is also correct that the term appears less and less in those formations, but, still, Bagaturija's assertion is completely wrong. He did not take authorial purpose, the logical dimensions of the manuscripts nor the differences between Marx's and Engels' views into account. The disappearance of the term is mainly due to Engels' views and the authorial purpose of {1} and {2}, which are the Introductions and 'a few general observations' on the Young-Hegelian movement. Bagaturija accepts what he should not, and does not accept that which he should. He is a good example of the best and the brightest of Soviet Marxists.

THE MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY AND MARX'S CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

The term 'the materialist interpretation of history' strictly belongs to Engels. Engels used the term for the first time in his "Book Review: Marx's Contribution to A Critique of Political Economy " (1859)[13], indicating Marx's brief formulation of 'The general result at which I [Marx] arrived, which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies' in its Preface. Engels used the term again in his Anti-Dühring (1877-1878)[14]. On the other hand, Marx never uses the term the 'materialist interpretation of history'. Instead, as is quoted above, Marx himself called the brief formulation the 'general result', to which he was led by his critical investigation of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right, as the 'guiding thread' for his studies. In his "Preface to the Second Edition" of Capital Marx called the 'general result' the 'materialist basis for my [dialectical] method'[15].
Let us appreciate Marx's witness above in the context of its background, i.e. as a criticism of Hegelian and Young-Hegelian philosophy. Marx calls the 'general result' 'the materialist basis' for his dialectical method to distinguish the material transformation of the economic conditions of production . . . , [from] the legal, political, . . . , or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms'[16]. So far, I do not see any great dissimilarity between Marx and Engels. At least for both of them, the 'general result' is not the proposition that every political and social antagonism ought to be explained from an economic antagonism.
However, the term 'the materialist interpretation of history' diverts our attention from 'the materialist basis' for his method to 'history' qua history. For Marx, history is investigated in terms of the process of production and reproduction, through which the economic conditions of production are changed. The term 'history' concerns change, as Marx's 'dialectical method' indicates the method of inquiry which 'regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well'[17]. Thus the 'general result' is equivalent to 'a guiding thread' for his studies and the 'materialist basis' for his method. This means that the terms Marx developed in FEUERBACH, such as 'productive forces', 'relations of production' and 'economic structure of society', made it possible for him to comprehend the transient aspect of capitalist society as being in motion.
Marx's critique of political economy is a critical system of the economic categories. The economic categories are understood as theoretical expressions of capitalist relations of production and commerce. The historical character and the intrinsic connection between capitalist relations of production and commerce is expressed in the definitions of economic categories. Capitalist formation of society is dialectically comprehended as a transient formation in history through his 'genetic presentation' of economic categories. The term 'materialist interpretation of history', albeit not so irrelevant to the contents of FEUERBACH, is not explanatory at all but misleading.
What really concerns Marx is the development of the social individual and a revolution which transcends the political emancipation of man in capitalist society. Thus his concepts 'the means of production', 'the relations of production' and 'property' should not be understood, as Marx states in EPM, 'only in the sense of direct, one-side consumption, of possession, of having'[18] but in the sense of 'the sensuous appropriation of the human essence and human life'[19].
Lastly, I examine the implications of Marx's testimony that he arrived at the 'general result' through his critical inquiry into the Hegelian Philosophy of Right. This implies that he had already arrived at the result by the time of EPM, and that EPM, Marx's first critique of political economy, must have been guided by the 'general result', or he could not testify 'which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies [critique of political economy]'. On the other hand, FEUERBACH is the first formulation of the 'general result' but is not at all a critique of political economy. Consequently, for a better understanding of Marx's critique of political economy, we should investigate FEUERBACH then EPM, albeit they were written in reverse order[20].

CONCLUSION

We have examined the so-called 'materialist interpretation of history' in FEUERBACH and arrived at the following result:
Firstly, the 'materialist interpretation of history' is, as a matter of fact, the 'materialist basis' for Marx's dialectical method of inquiry, which enables us to understand a definite form of the State and laws from a certain form of civil society, i.e., the sum total of the relations of production and commerce. The relations of production are the relations of immediate producers to each other, i.e., the mode of cooperation. Productive forces are the relationship of producers to nature. Thus, productive forces contain not only the means of production but also the cooperation of individuals itself. Productive forces and the relations of production are the two different sides of the social individual. In other words, the development of the social individual is expressed in the development of productive forces and in the relations of production. A new generation inherits certain conditions of production from all preceding generations. It produces in completely different circumstances and modifies the old circumstances. In this way, a form of property has positive and negative sides.
The relations of production develop from communal to social, i.e. the direct unity with other men to the product of social intercourse. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal and capitalist modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The capitalist mode of production is the mode in which objects (the means of production) subsume the subject (producers). It is the zenith of the estrangement of life-activity but brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close. The capitalist mode of production can be abolished positively, only by an association of free men and by appropriating universally developed productive forces which are a result of the estrangement. These insights are expounded through Marx's presentation of economic categories, or his analysis of capitalist relations of production and commerce, but not in FEUERBACH. Thus, for a better understanding of Marx's thought and theories, we have to investigate EPM, Grundrisse and Capital.

(In memory of Miss Gillian Clare Dood. I would like to thank Dr.Barry Dodd and Dr. Terrell Carver who looked over the draft and checked my English. Naturally any deficiencies are my own responsibility.)

NOTES

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[1]. See my "The Editing Problems of The German Ideology " in: Journal of Social Studies, Takushoku University, Vol., 2, No. 1, 1994.

[2]. The term 'formation', 'epoch' and 'progressive' are technical terms of geology and are to be understood as such. 'Progressive' does not mean the line of development is the necessary and the only one.

[3]. David McLellan, Karl Marx Selected Writings, Oxford, p.390.

[4]. In the strict sense, the antagonism between country and town, begins in feudal property, albeit {3}c says 'We already find the antagonism of town and country' in the ancient mode of property.

[5] . In order to comprehend the antagonism between country and town, the essence of private property is to be grasped as 'commanding power over labour of other men', or, the advantages of capital over landed property cannot be comprehended. If Marx thought that civilisation begins only with the ancient mode of production, there might not be any large difference between Marx and Engels on this point, but I do not think it likely.

[6]. See KARL MARX-FREDERICK ENGELS Collected Works, Volume 3, p.247 or Karl Marx: Early Writings, Penguin ed., p.295.

[7]. See my "Individual, Social and Common Property" in: The Review of Takushoku University, No. 199, 1993.

[8]. KARL MARX-FREDERICK ENGELS Collected Works, Volume 38, p.96.

[9]. Grundrisse, Pelican ed., p.706 or MEGA2, II-1, Teil 2, S.582.

[10]. Engels had never used the term 'estrangement', but shared a similar view with Marx on capitalist production. For example:

What are we to think of a law [of competition] which can only assert itself through periodic upheavals? It is certainly a natural law based on the unconsciousness of the participants. . . . Carry on production consciously as human beings -- not as dispersed atoms without consciousness of your species -- and you have overcome all these artificial and untenable antitheses (KARL MARX-FREDERICK ENGELS Collected Works, Volume 3, pp.433-434).

[11]. See, e.g. chapter II section C.of my "Individual, Social and Common Property."

[12]. Bagaturija, "The Structure and the Contents of the First Chapter of The German Ideology by K. Marx and F. Engels" in: Problems in Philosophy, October-November, 1965.

[13]. F. Engels, "Book Review: Marx's Contribution to A Critique of Political Economy " (1859).

[14]. See Part III, Chapter II of his Anti-Dühring in: KARL MARX-FREDERICK ENGELS Collected Works, Volume 25, p.254 or Chapter III of his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific in: Marx/Engels Selected Works in one volume, Progress Publishers, p.411.

[15]. Capital, Volume 1, Pelican ed., p.102 .

[16]. David McLellan, op.cit. pp.389-390.

[17]. Capital, Volume 1, Pelican ed., p.103.

[18]. KARL MARX-FREDERICK ENGELS Collected Works, Volume 3, p.299 or Karl Marx: Eearly Writings, p.351.

[19]. Ebd.

[20]. Marx also writes in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy that FEUERABCH was abandoned 'to the gnawing criticism of mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose -- self-clarification'. This 'self-clarification' has been used by the Soviet Marxists to negate Marx's works preceding FEUERBACH, especially EPM, in order to make Soviet society an exception to the criticism of 'crude communism' there. This has been successful so long as it found wider support among western followers, but it is a crude understanding of the passage. In the context, it does not support their views at all.