Takahisa Oishi
Professor of Economics
Takushoku University
Tokyo, Japan
I. Introduction
This paper is devoted to clarifying Marx's concept
of 'individual property' and 'social property' in
Capital (1867), volume 1.[1] Marx's communism[2] is
one of the most basic subjects in Marxology and
has been discussed by a large number of commentators.
However, I believe Marx's view is still little known
or, at least, not known well enough for the following
three reasons:
Firstly: Engels is partly to be blamed. There are
significant differences between Marx and Engels on
some basic points of their communism. As we shall
see later, Engels misinterpreted Marx's 'negation
of negation', 'realm of freedom', 'individual property'
and 'social property' in Capital. However, this
has not been understood until now because Engels has
been regarded as the most authoritative commentator
on Marx's theories. That which we know as Marx's
theories is Engels' interpretation of them and may
be quite different.
Secondly: Stalinism is to be blamed. Soviet Marxists
were reluctant to publish some of Marx's works, including
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844
(hereafter EPM) and the letter to Vera Zassoulitch
(1881),[3] which indicates that they have published
only those parts favourable to them. Engels' interpretation
of Marx's works was more to their liking than the
originals. They could justify their oppressive political
system with some parts of Engels' works.
Thirdly: Commentators themselves are to be blamed.
They have been influenced by commentaries from Engels
and from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, both in
Moscow and in Berlin. Consciously or unconsciously,
they have not supported the peoples of Eastern Europe
but rather the ruling classes, the Communist Parties
in those countries. Whatever the reason, the time
has come to understand Marx in his own words.
Firstly, we are now completely free from the
influence of Soviet Marxism. Secondly and more importantly,
the present is simmilar to the time in which Marx developed
his thought and theories. The 1840s saw many different
socialisms in France, which Marx criticised as a 'bungled
job', and also in Germany. Also there was Owen's
pilot community ('New Harmony') and its failure.
However, it was the time when Marx formulated his
communism in EPM which has been neglected, or rather
prohibited completely by Soviet Marxism. This suggests
that we had better make a fresh start from EPM to
understand Marx's communism in his own words.
It may sound reasonable to categorise Marx's words
under 'state property' and 'planned economy', but
this is to be trapped by Soviet Marxism. I would
like to start my paper instead by comparing Engels'
Anti-Duehring (hereafter Anti) and Marx's Capital
in order to extract some apparent differences between
their communism, and to follow this by inquiring into
their genesis.
Although The German Ideology (1845-46) and
The Communist Manifesto (1847-48) are widely known
to have been written by both Marx and Engels,
I treat them here as Marx's views and were written
by him alone, because both differ from Engels' Principles
of Communism (1847) and Anti. Also I treat all Marx's
works as consistent with each other. The so-called
inconsistency between the 'young Marx' and the 'old
Marx' is but a fiction set up by Soviet Marxism and
its followers. This paper will illustrate the controversy.
II. Marx Vs. Engels on Communism
A. Communism in Anti-Duehring
What marks Anti is its method: Engels explains that
the 'contradiction between socialised production and
capitalistic appropriation' manifested itself as the
'antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie', as the
'antagonism between the organisation of production
in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production
in society in general' and as 'crises'. By the 'contradiction'
he means that the 'means of production of the individual'
has been transformed into the 'social means of production
only workable by a collectivity of men', and that
'production itself changed from a series of individual
into a series of social acts, and the products from
individual to social product', but 'the old forms
of appropriation remained in full swing' and 'the
owner of the instruments of labour always appropriated
to himself the products . . . of the labour of others'.
This revolt of the productive forces makes the
capitalist class treat the forces more and more as
'social productive forces, so far as this is possible
under capitalist conditions': They merge into 'the
different kinds of joint-stock companies' and
into 'state property'.[4] However, they are not the
abolition of 'the capitalistic nature of the productive
forces' at all. On the contrary, 'state ownership'
is nothing but 'the zenith' of the capitalist relation.
State ownership is not and cannot be the 'solution
of the conflict, but concealed within it are the technical
conditions that form the elements of that solution'.
This solution can only consist in the practical recognition of the social nature of the modern forces of production, and therefore in the harmonising of the modes of production, appropriation and exchange with the social character of the means of production. And this can only come about by society openly and directly taking possession of the productive forces . . . (Marx-Engels Collected Works, Vol. 25, p.266. Hereafter cited as 25 MEC 266).
The real solution of the conflict is summarised as: 'the proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production in the first instance into state property'. As 'the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society' is the first and the last act as a state, 'state property' becomes 'the direct social appropriation' (25 MEC 267).
B. Similarity between Anti-Dühring and Capital
It is clear that the outline of Anti is the same as
that of Capital. The two share similar terms and statements.
On closer examination, however, there are differences
between the two works even on some significant points.
I would like to illustrate some of these in the next
section.
C. Dissimilarities between Anti-Dühring and
Capital
1. 'Realm of Necessity' and 'Realm of Freedom'
The most significant and the most apparent dissimilarity
between Anti and Capital is in the concepts 'realm
of freedom' and 'realm of necessity'. Engels writes:
Man's own social organisation, hitherto confronting
him as a necessity imposed by nature and history,
now becomes the result of his own free action .
. . . Only from that time will man himself, with
full consciousness, make his own history only from
that time will the social causes set in motion by him
have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure,
the results intended by him. It is humanity's leap
from the realm
of necessity to the realm of freedom (25 MEC 270).
On the other hand, Capital, volume 3, says:
With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man (der vergesellschaftete Mensch ), the associated producers (die assoziierten Produzenten ), rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins the development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The Shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite (Capital I, Pelican ed., p.959. Hereafter cited as Capital I, 959).
The 'realm of freedom' of Engels is the realm of conscious
and planned control of the social metabolism by the
associated producers.[5] However, this still belongs
to the 'realm of necessity' in Capital. 'The realm
of freedom', writes Marx, 'actually begins only where
labour which is determined by necessity and mundane
considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of
things it lies beyond the realm of actual material
production' (ebd.). Marx's 'realm of freedom'
is the sphere of 'free time' or 'disposable
time' beyond the working-day. It is not the leisure
time as compensation for estrangement in the working-day.
It is 'time for free development of the workers for
society, i.e. civilisation' (Grundrisse, Pelican ed.,
p.634. Hereafter cited as Gr., 634); the appropriation
of surplus-time by the capitalist is the appropriation
of civilisation by the capitalist.
Now we come to the following conclusions: 'Realm
of freedom' in Anti differs from that in Capital.
Anti lacks the 'realm of freedom' in Capital.
2. 'Social Property'
a. 'Negation of Negation' in Anti-Duehring
The second remarkable difference between Anti and Capital is their concepts of 'social property' and 'individual property'. Duehring understands Marx's 'negation of negation' as the 'property which is at once both individual and social' and criticise him by saying that Marx 'leaves it to his adepts to solve for themselves this profound dialectical enigma' (25 MEC 120). Engels' explanation of it is his critique of Duehring's interpretation. He says that 'this means that social ownership extends to the land and the other means of production, and individual ownership to the products, that is, the articles of consumption' (25 MEC 121). He repeats his view on page 267. Let us formulate their interpretations before we quote Marx's original and examine which is correct.
Duehring: individual property = social property
<> common property
Engels : individual property <> social
property = common property
b. 'Negation of Negation' in Capital
The second German edition[6] of Capital, volume 1, says:
The capitalist mode of production and of appropriation,
accordingly capitalist private property, is the
first negation of individual private property, as
founded on the labour of its proprietor; but capitalist
production begets . . . its own negation. This
is the negation of negation. It re-establishes
individual property on the basis of the the achievements
of the capitalist era: namely cooperation of free workers
and their possession in common of the land and
the means of production
produced by labour itself. . . . [The] transformation
of capitalist private property which in fact rests
on the carrying on of production by society, into
social property (Capital I, 929-30. Italics mine).
The French version begins with 'the capitalist mode
of production and of appropriation that corresponds
to it is . . . ' and omits the 'free workers'. The
present German and the English versions were rewritten
or modified by Engels. As far as we can distinguish
a mode of appropriation from its basis and understand
it in its context, we cannot agree with Duehring
more.
'individual private property (as founded on the
labour of its proprietor)'
Ü" 'capitalist private property (which rests
on the exploitation of alien, but formally free labour)'
Ü" 'individual property (on the basis of .
. . cooperation and the free workers' possession in
common of the land and the means of production produced
by labour itself)'
= 'social property' Let us formulate this and compare
it with that of Engels:
Marx : individual property =social property
<> common property
Engels: individual property <> social
property = common property
Thus we arrive in this roundabout way at the starting
point the controversy between Duehring and Engels:
what kind of property it is which is 'at once
both individual and social'; but one thing has become
clear, Engels is not correct. So let us make a fresh
start with the examination of his faults.
Firstly, Engels misunderstands Marx's 'social property':
'social property' is set against 'capitalist
private property' and cannot be equivalent to 'common
property', which is a mere basis of 'individual
property'. 'Social property' should be understood
as equivalent to 'individual property'. That
is the problem which misled Engels. He understands
by appropriation 'appropriation of the means of production
and of the products' (25 MEC 269) or 'the taking
possession' (Besitzergreifung ) of them. However,
he meant originally 'appropriation of productive
forces', did he not?
Secondly, Engels failed to understand Marx's
'individual property' fully. No wonder that part
of the product is consumed by individuals as means
of subsistence. However, Engels failed to explain
why the second negation is described as the 'reestablish
[ment]' of individual property. There must be something
more in it than 'the ownership to . . . .the
articles of consumption.' He failed to tell us that
'individual private property' is 'the foundation
of small-scale industry, and small- scale industry
is a necessary condition for the development of social
production and of the free individuality of the
worker himself' (Capital I, 927). The 're-establish[ment]'
or the second negation must succeed individual property
'on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist
era'. We have examined Engels' remarks within chapter
32 of Capital, volume 1. If we take other Marx's
works into account, it will become clearer that
Engels' interpretation of 'individual property'
is defective. From 1844 onward, Marx describes the
future social relations as 'association'. The EPM
, The German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy (1848),
The Communist Manifesto and J. Most's Capital and
Labour by Marx (corrected by Marx himself) says eine
Assoziation (an association) or eine Vereinigung (a
union) of free workers is established by the 'negation
of negation'. Capital and Labour by Marx, e.g., says:
Thus individual property is re-established, but on
the basis of the achievements of the modern mode
of production. So we have an association of free
workers who possess in common the land and the means
of production produced by labour itself (MEGA2,áU-8,
S.783).
This shows us that Marx's 'individual property' is equivalent to 'an association of free workers' which links 'individual property' to 'social property' by bringing us back to the end of chapter 1 of Capital, volume 1. There Marx writes:
Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force (Capital I, 171. Italics mine).
That which Engels quoted as the grounds for his argument turns into the grounds for an argument against him, if we understand by 'appropriation' the 'relations of production and forms of intercourse [Verkehrverh$ltnisse] that corresponds to it' (Capital I, 90). Anyway, we can now formulate Marx's four concepts as follows:
individual property = an association of free workers
= social property <> common property
We now come to a conclusion that Anti differs from Capital even on some basic points. Anti has been thought to be the best introduction to Marx's Capital, his thought and theories, but we should stop reading it as such. In the next chapter I make Marx's socialism clearer by showing where these dissimilarities come from and what causes them.
III. Individual, social and Common Property
A. The Labour Process & 'Individual Property'
1. The General Character of the Labour Process and of Appropriation
Physically and mentally human beings need nature and
can live only through a metabolism between themselves
and nature. Nature, in this sense, is the inorganic
body of human beings, but it does not satisfy human
needs as it is. Labour is a process between human
beings and nature, a process by which man mediates,
regulates and controls the metabolism between himself
and nature. Man changes external nature using his
physical and mental powers in order to appropriate
(aneignen ) the materials of nature in a form adapted
to his own needs.[7] This action is not only a change
of form for the materials of nature but a realisation
(Verwirklichung ) of his own purposes.[8] Man changes
his own nature through this purposeful action. In this
process he uses an instrument to direct his activity
onto objects. The instrument becomes 'one of his organs
of his activity, which he annexes to his own bodily
organs.'[9]
The simple elements of the labour process are 1)
purposeful activity, 2) the object on which that
work is performed, and 3) the instruments of that
work. Without any one of these elements, no production
is possible.
With regard to the result, the product, both
the instruments and the object of labour are means
of production and the labour itself is productive
labour. Production is the relation of productive
labour to means of production. It is man's realisation
of his physical and mental powers, i.e. himself and
his life, and the development of his powers through
it. The labour process is an appropriation of what
exists in nature for the requirements of men. The labour
process in its simple elements is the universal condition
for the metabolic interaction (Stoffwechsel) between
man and nature. It is worth repeating that Eigentum
(appropriation) in this sense is abstract but is
also its first and original meaning.[10] We should
understand by 'appropriation' the relationship of
the worker to his means of production but not the relationship with
the person to whom the products belong. 'Appropriation'
should be understood as a process of production,
or the whole of the relations of production, and
the realisation and the confirmation of the
worker's species-life.[11]
Incidentally, the labour process is not usually
carried on by a single worker but by many workers.
Workers usually cooperate in the process, which
means that workers also develop 'the capabilities
of his species (Gattungsvermoegen )'[12] through
their cooperation and the labour process.
2. Historical Features of the Capitalist Labour Process
The three elements of the labour process become separated
from each other. Under capitalist relations of production,
immediate producers are separated from their means
of production, and this separation is reproduced
every day. The producers have to sell their labour-power,
i.e. creative power and source of all wealth, to survive.
They lose all other means of life. They cannot
carry out the labour process alone any more. The
labour process, i.e. production is now carried out
by capitalists only and it becomes a process by which
capitalists consume labour-power they purchase or
'a process between things the capitalist has purchased,
'exhibiting two characteristic features:
1) the worker works under the control (command) of
the capitalist to whom his labour belongs;
2) the product is the property of the capitalist and
not of its immediate producer. 'Capital develop[s]
within the production process until it acquired
command over labour, i.e. over self- activating labour
power, in other words the worker himself.'[13]
Working under the control of the capitalist is
characteristic for human beings alone. It is possible
only because man is a species-being. The animal is
immediately one with its life activity and cannot
make its life activity itself an object, but man
can. Man can make his life-activity the object
of his will and of his consciousness. In this
case the strong point of man appears as his weak
point, and man's life-activity loses any sense of
the objectification of his species-life.
Working under the control of the capitalist means
not only the alienation of labour-power but also
social ability, an ability to have social intercourse
with others. Cooperation in the production process
is performed only under the command of the capitalist,
not under the contro l of the workers themselves,
and cooperation becomes part of the power of capital.
It ceases to be a realisation of the workers'
own social ability. Additionally, the products belong
to the capitalist and are sold in the market. The
social intercourse via products ceases to be a relation
of producers to each other, becoming instead a
relation of products to other products. The immediate
producer loses his power to mediate relations
with other men with his products.
The capitalist mode of appropriation,
based on the separation of productive labour from
its means of production, should not be understood
merely as the worker's loss of products, but also as
the loss of his personal and social abilities.
3. 'Individual Property'
Now let us go back to the 'negation of negation' in Capital, volume 1. When we read the chapter carefully, the focus is on the proprietor of the means of production, on the immediate producer, and on production or appropriation as the combination of three elements of the labour process. That is so, whether 'the means of production and the external conditions of labour belong to private individuals' or not, 'whether these private individuals are producers or non-workers,' and the general character of '(private) property', i.e. the mode of production or of appropriation. We can formulate the three modes of appropriation in this chapter as follows:
Character of Property Individual as
Individual as
Proprietor
Producer
___________________________________________________
Individual Private Property Yes
Yes
_______Negation_____________________________________
Capitalist Private Property No
No
_______Negation_____________________________________
Individual Property Yes(Common
Yes
Property)
(Cooperation)
'Individual property' is the new mode of appropriation
into which capitalistic private property is transformed
through a long process but not so long as that of
the first negation. 'Individual property' means
'all production has been concentrated in the hands
of associated individuals' (6 MEC 505) who work
with common property in the means of production.
All individuals are proprietors of their means of
production and are immediate workers. The original
unity of labour with its external conditions is recovered
on a new basis, which is the achievements of
the capitalist era: namely 'cooperation of free
workers and their possession in common of the
land and the means of production produced by
labour itself.'
I do not think I need to remind readers that
'individual property' also means the universal
development of the workers' individuality. There
is, however, one thing left which requires comment
on, i.e. 'social production'. Marx writes in
relation to small-scale production that it is
the basis of 'social production'. Before this
mode of production, there was only communal
production, where all members of the community
worked together at the same time and the members
were not independent of the community itself
but were immersed in it. Small-scale production,
however, set the members free and made them
independent individuals through commodity production.
In that mode of production individuals work separately
and their labour is immediately private, not social
or communal. Those private labours become social
through an exchange of their products, by making
up the whole quantity of labour that society needs.
Exchange value of the commodity expresses a new
historical way of conceptualising social labour or
the social nature of labour.
Thus, the first negation, the supplanting of
'individual private property' by 'capitalistic
private property', creates a universal development
of human socia l intercourse by producing an
'immense collection of commodities'. Commodity
production is fully developed on its own foundations,
and universal (in this sense 'free') social relations
of men are created, for the first time in opposition
to the immediate producers themselves. This,
however, forms the real basis for the full development
of humanity.
Personal independence founded on objective dependence
is the second great form, in which a system of
general social metabolism, of universal relations,
of all-round needs and universal capacities is
formed for the first time. Free individuality,
based on the universal development of
individuals and on the subordination of their communal,
social productivity as their social wealth, is
the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions
of the third (Gr., 158).
It is now clear that Marx's 'individual property' does not 'extend . . . to the products, that is, the articles of consumption' at all but to the universal development of individuality of the individual workers. In the following section, we examine Marx's 'individual property' more closely by inquiring into the concepts 'appropriation of productive forces' and 'social property'.
B. 'Appropriation of Productive Forces' and 'Social Property'
The German Ideology says that appropriation by free workers is determined by: 1) 'the object to be appropriated', 2) 'the persons appropriating' and 3) 'the manner in which it must be effected'. Thus in this section I would like to compare and examine Marx's and Engels' concepts of 'individual property' and 'social property' more precisely according to these criteria.
1. The Object to Be Appropriated
The German Ideology says that 'the object to be
appropriated' is 'the productive forces, which
have been developed to a totality and which only
exist within a universal intercourse' amongst individuals.
'Productive forces' does not only mean the 'means
of production'. 'Productive forces' are said to 'exist
within a universal intercourse. ' On a preceding page,
Marx also writes: that 'the social power, i.e. the
multiplied productive force, which arises through
the cooperation of different individuals as it is.'
Capital, volume 1, is consistent with The German
Ideology when it says in chapter 32 that individual
property is re- established on the basis of the achievements
of the capitalist era,' i.e. 'cooperation of free
workers and their possession in common of the land
and the means of production.'
Anti, however, is not consistent. Engels writes
correctly that the proletariat succeeds the 'socialised
productive power' in the capitalist mode of production.
On the other hand, he describes the 'real solution',
socialism, as 'taking possession of the means of
production in the name of society, ' which leads him
directly to 'social appropriation' extending to
'the land and the other means of production'. His
concept of 'appropriation' does not include 'the
cooperation' of the workers. His 'appropriation'
is not 'production', but 'possession' of the products.
'The so-called community of property' (6 MEC 348)
of the early Engels shows that he had never counted
'cooperation' as a 'productive force'. This explains
why Engels rewrites the opening sentence on 'negation
of negation' (which I quoted in the preceding chapter)
as follows in the present German and English editions:
'The capitalist mode of appropriation, which springs
from the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist
private property.' This rewriting is based on the
distinction between the mode of production and that
of appropriation.
2. The Persons Appropriating and the Manner of Appropriation
The German Ideology says that 'the persons appropriating'
are 'the proletarians'. It also says that 'the manner
in which it must be effected' is 'a union, which
. . . can again only be a universal one, and through
a revolution.' Seemingly Capital and Anti are
similar on this. However, if we examine both works
closely and take 'the object' and 'the manner'
of the appropriation into account, we will find
that Marx considers the proletarians as 'individuals',
and Engels considers them as a group, 'society'.
For Marx 'the persons appropriating' must be
'individuals', because workers in the capitalist
mode of production 'have become abstract individuals,
who are, however, by this very fact put into a position
to enter into relations with one another as individuals'
(5 MEC 87). Thus The German Ideology and Capital
mention 'an association'[14] of 'free workers'. On
theother hand, Anti says the appropriation of all
means of production 'by society' (25 MEC 268).
Here we must take into account the distinction
between the different concepts of 'appropriation'
held by the two. For Marx 'appropriation' is 'production',
thus it is individuals who enter into cooperation
in the production process. For Engels, however,
'appropriation' is 'possession' of the means of production,
thus the subject who appropriates has to be a group,
i.e. 'society'. Keen-eyed readers may defend Engels
by asserting that he uses 'the hands of the producers
working together (assoziierte Produzenten)' (25 MEC
267) once. This is, however, a supplement to the
Fourth Edition of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific
(1891) and extends only to the means of production.
Now it is safe to conclude that dissimilarities
in the concepts of 'appropriation' and '(appropriation
of) productive forces' led Marx and Engels to hold
different concepts of 'individual property' and 'social
property'.
3. 'Social Property'
Let us summarise the concept of 'social property' in Marx and Engels. Marx's concept is equivalent to the 'appropriation of productive forces' developed universally in the capitalist era; it consists of cooperation amongst workers and of the means of production. Thus, it extends to their 'universal intercourse between men' (5 MEC 49) which 'cannot be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all' (5 MEC 88). This requires 'the association of individuals . . . which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control' (5 MEC 80). Marx's 'individual Property', as the basis for the development of universal individuality, cannot exist except through this association in which individuals obtain freedom. Marx's individual property can exist only as 'social property'.
Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals (5 MEC 81).
Engels' concept of the 'appropriation of productive
forces', however, is limited to 'taking possession'
of the means of production. Thus he omits the cooperation
amongst workers and, consequently, their association
or their universal intercourse. Though he uses Marx's term
'associated workers', it does not link with other
statements in his argument. It is necessary for
Engels to explain Marx's 'social property' and 'individual
property' as 'upon the one hand, direct social
appropriation, as means to the maintenance and extension
of production on the other, direct individual appropriation,
as means of subsistence and of enjoyment' (25 MEC 267).
This dissimilarity also leads Marx and Engels
to their different visions on communism. Engels is
very optimistic and sounds as if taking possession
of the means of production by 'society' would make
everything all right, e.g. he says:
With the seizing of the means of production by society,
production of commodities is done away with, and,
simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the
producer (25 MEC 270).
From the moment when society enters into possession
of the means of production and uses them in direct
association for production, the labour of each individual,
however varied its specifically useful character
may be, becomes at the start and directly social labour
(25 MEC 294).
This optimism comes naturally from his concept of 'social'. Marx, on the other hand, is a bit more prudent, e.g. he writes:
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is
to be established, an ideal to which reality [will]
have to adjust itself. We call communism the real
movement which abolishes the present state of things
(5 MEC 49).
Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected
except by means of despotic inroads on the rights
of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois
production; by means of measures, therefore, which
appear economically insufficient and untenable,
but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip
themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the
old social order, and are unavoidable as a means
of entirely revolutionising the mode of production
(6 MEC 504).
The author of Capital recognises very well through his analysis of the 'commodity' that even in 'an association of free men, . . . expending their many different forms of labour- power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force,'[15] their labour can be 'social' only when they fulfill the following two conditions: 1) 'On the one hand, it must, as a definite useful kind of labour, satisfy a definite social need, and thus maintain its position as an element of the total labour.' 2) 'On the other hand, it can satisfy the manifold needs of the individual producer himself only in so far as every particular kind of useful private [read this as: individual] can be exchanged with.'[16] As far as the second point is concerned, 'labour-time would in that case play a double part' and may serve as the direct measure of distribution. The first point, however, is feasible only through 'a definite social plan' developed democratically by the individuals themselves. I would like to make Marx's concept of communism clearer by investigating his concept of the 'essence of private property' after a brief comment on his 'common property'.
C. 'Common Property'
1. 'Common Property'
Marx's concept of 'common property or communal property'
(Gemeineigentum ) extends, without any doubt, exclusively
to the means of production. Thus, Engels does not
differ from Marx on this concept. The only possible
point of difference is whether the immediate workers
have free access to the means of production or whether
the means of production belong to some institution
independent of the workers themselves.
In Capital Marx writes clearly: 'the free workers'
possession of the land and the means of production
produced by labour itself.' This leaves no room for
any doubt. The producers are supposed to have free
access to the means of production they need. According
to Marx, what is important for the workers is to recover
an original unity with the conditions of production
and to develop their individuality universally, or
else the revolution becomes meaningless.[17]
Although Engels sometimes seems to give 'society'
priority over 'individuals', he also thinks that
workers should have easy access to the means of production,
because his concept 'community of property' is
'common use of all the instruments of production and
the distribution of all products by common agreement'
(6 MEC 348).
2. The Germanic Community
Both Marx and Engels write that workers must gain
complete control over universally developed productive
forces and over social powers, including those
which arose from workers' but because opposed to
them. Hence every individual is expected to be able
to use 'common property'. Marx's description of the
Germanic community, which preceded the capitalist
mode of production, gives us a clear vision of 'common
property'. In the Germanic relations of property, the
independent unit at the bottom is the family, which
'settled in the forests, long distances apart,'
and the commune exists only 'in the periodic
gathering-together (Vereinigung )' of the commune
members (free landed proprietors) for shared purposes.
'The commune thus appears as a coming- together
(Vereinigung ), not as a being-together (Verein )'
(Gr., 483). 'The commune exists only in the interrelations
among these individual landed proprietors as such'
(Gr., 484). Communal property, as distinct from
individual property, also occurs amongst Germanic
tribes taking 'the form of hunting land . . . etc.,
the part of the land which cannot be divided if it
is to serve as means of production in this specific
form.' It appears, however, 'merely as a complement
to individual property' and 'is so used by each
individual proprietor as such' (Gr., 485).
The main point here is this: In the Germanic
relations of property 'the existence of the commune
and of communal property appears as mediated by, i.e.
as a relation of, the independent subjects to one
another' (Gr., 484). Read instead the 'individual
landed proprietor' as the 'free worker', the 'commune'
as an 'association of free workers' and 'communal
property' as the 'common property of free workers',
then you obtain a clearer picture of Marx's 'individual
property', 'social property' and 'common property'.
D. Conclusion
The capitalist mode of production and appropriation
is based on the appropriation of alien labour, the
social power of immediate workers. Marx's communism
is the movement to replace this mode of production
with 'an association of free men, working with the
means of production held in common, and expending
their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness
as one single social labour force.' Thus the new
mode of 'appropriation' as the mode of 'production'
is both 'individual' and 'social' at once, so far
as the 'association' is a 'society' mediated by
its free individual members. The main points here
are the following:
1) 'Appropriation' should not be understood exclusively
as 'possession of the means of production'.
2) 'Individuals produce in society and for society
as social-beings and subsume the community (cooperation
and social intercourse among them) into themselves
with the consciousness of a community-being.'[18]
3) 'Individual = social property' is the mode of production
which forms the basis of the free development of human
abilities, organic and inorganic, and of the human
senses, i.e. of the universal development of their
individuality.
4) Consequently, in due course, the meaning of
'social' will alter from mere relations among private
men into the relations among individual human-beings
who affirm each other as truly equal.[19]
In the next chapter I would like to examine the innermost
principle of Marx's system which Engels failed to understand.
IV. The Nature of Capital as the Principle of Marx's System
A. The Nature of Capital & The Concept of Capital
1. 'The Twofold Proof' of Capital
In 1843 Marx left the Rheinishe Zeitung to 'withdraw from the public stage into the study'. The reasons are clear: he faced a twofold historical problem with private property; but his 'previous studies did not permit [him] even to venture any judgment on the content of the French tendencies'. On the one hand, private property was establishing itself in Germany, producing 'so-called material interests'. In England and in France, however, 'the content of the . . . tendencies' was the abolition of private property. Thus Marx's withdrawal from the public stage means that he began to examine the twofold proof of private property on the one hand that human life required it for the realisation of civilisation and on the other that it now requires the supersession of it. To answer this question only Hegel's Philosophy of Right, an exceptional critique of modern civil society in Germany, would do.
If we wanted to start with the German status quo itself,
the result would still be an anachronism even if one
did it in the only adequate way. . . .
Even the denial of our political present is already
a dusty fact in the historical lumber-room of modern
peoples (3 MEC 176).
To raise criticism to the level of 'the question of which the present age says: that is the question' is to criticise the socio-political circumstances of England and of France and adress the controversy between political economists and French socialists. Marx aimed to analyse the nature of capital and to abolish it positively. The first work in which he undertook for this solution was his EPM, [20] which will be examined closely in this chapter. I need not remind readers that Marx was never on the socialists' side, however strange it may sound. He has already declared himself against its 'amateurism' and had begun to study classical political economy critically.
2. The Nature of Capital & The Concept of Capital
The nature of something is clearer at its maturity than
at its embryo. Capital is the high point of private
property, which started historically with the form
of landed property. Consequently, the nature of capital
is the nature of private property of all forms. Classical
political economy understood it as 'labour in general',
as is well known. What about Marx? 'Estranged labour'!
Let me show this by distinguishing the 'nature of
private property' from the 'concept of private property'
in EPM.
IN the 'First Manuscript: Latter Part' (so-called
'Estranged Labour') and in the 'Second Manuscript'
of EPM, Marx analyses the immediate production process
of capital in terms of 'two components which depend
on one another, or which are but different expression
of one and the same relationship' (3 MEC 281):
(1) 'the direct relationship between the worker and
production' (3 MEC 273)
= 'relationship of labour to its products' and 'the
relationship of the worker to the objects of his production'
(3 MEC 274)
= the relation in which 'appropriation appears as estrangement,
as alienation' (3 MEC 281)
= 'the relation of the worker to labour and to the product
of his labour'
= 'alienated labour in relation to the worker himself,
i.e. the relation of alienated labour to itself' (3
MEC 281)
= 'the relation of private property as labour' (3 MEC
285)
= 'the production of human activity as labour that is,
as an activity quite alien to itself, to man and to
nature' (3 MEC 285)
(2) 'the relationship of the man of means to the objects
of production and to production itself' (3 MEC 274)
= 'the relation to it [labour] of the capitalist' (3
MEC 279)
= the relationship in which 'alienation appears as appropriation,
estrangement as truly becoming a citizen' (3 MEC 281)
= 'the relation of the non-worker to the worker and
to the product of his labour'
= 'the property relation of the non-worker to the worker
and to labour' (3 MEC 281)
= 'the relation to the worker, to labour and its object
of this person who is alien to labour and the worker'
(3 MEC 281-2)
= 'the relation of private property as capital' (3 MEC
285)
= 'the production of the object of human activity as
capital in which all natural and social characteristics
of the object is extinguished' (3 MEC 285)
It is already known that the second relation is the
logical 'result, the necessary consequence' (3 MEC
279) or 'the necessary outcome' (3 MEC 281) of the
first. It is not well known, however, that the second
relation is the 'concept of private property'. Marx
writes that 'just as we have derived the concept of
private property from the concept of estranged, alienated
labour by analysis' (3 MEC 281), the second one is
the concept of capital. This can be supported by his
Grundrisse in which he criticised Smith by saying 'the
appropriation of alien labour is not itself included
in its [capital's] concept' (Grundrisse, Pelican ed.,
p.330). The appropriation of alien labour in the production
process is the concept of capital.[21]
What is less known is that the first relation of
alienated labour is the '(general) nature [Wesen] of
private property' (3 MEC 281). In the English version
of EPM, Wesen is translated as 'nature' in some cases
and as 'essence' in others, preventing readers from
following Marx's views. We find, if we read EPM very
carefully, that Marx writes on the preceding page that
'private property thus results by analysis from the
concept of alienated labour, i.e. of alienated man,
of estranged labour, of estranged life, of estranged
man' (3 MEC 279). The 'nature of private property'
is the 'activity quite alien to itself, to man and
to nature' (3 MEC 285). This is supported by the concept
of the 'subjective essence [Wesen] of private property'
in the 'Third Manuscript' of EPM and is consistent
with the description in the 'First Manuscript: First
Part' of EPM. The column 'Profit of Capital' begins
by saying 'what is the basis of capital, that is, of
private property in the products of other men's labour?',
followed by a rereading of Smith's concept of 'command'.
Marx concludes 'capital is thus the governing power
over labour and its products' (3 MEC 273-4)[22]. Marx's
Manuscripts of 1861-63 also supports this, because
Marx comments 'here at last, the nature of capital
is understood correctly' as he notes Hodgskin's remark
that 'fixed capital is bringing its owner a profit
. . .but because it is a measure of obtaining command
over labour'[23]. Let me repeat.The 'nature of capital'
is 'command over labour', the 'alien activity of the
worker' or the 'alienated labour', if you like. The
'concept of capital', i.e. the property relation of
the capitalist to the worker, is a mere result of this
'nature'.
Some commentators criticise Marx's use of 'private
property' rather than 'capital' by saying that the
early Marx cannot distinguish capital from private
property in general. However, the 'nature of capital',
derived from the immediate production process, is
the 'nature of private property in general' or the
'general nature of private property', which allows
Marx to analyse 'the economic process as such . .
. in its real concreatness' (3 MEC 317).
Firstly: 'It is clear that if the subjective nature
of industry [read as: capital] is now grasped [as 'labour
in general'], this nature includes within itself its
opposite' (3 MEC 293), i.e. agricultural labour. Consequently,
we can see 'how it is only at this point that private
property can complete its dominion over man and become,
in its most general form, a world-historical power'(ibid.),
and how 'this process repeats itself in the scientific
analysis of the subjective nature of private property'
as the development from F. Quesnay to A. Smith.
Secondly: If the subjective nature of private property
is grasped as estranged labour, we can easily see that
the abolition of capital is the abolition of all forms
of private property, in other words all class struggles.
From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the emancipation of society from private property, et., from servitude , is expressed in the political form of the emancipation of the workers . . . (3 MEC 280).
Thirdly: If the subjective nature of capital is grasped as 'estranged labour', as labour not in its natural nor eternal form but in its historical, we can resolve the controversy between the political economists and the French socialists by following Marx in EPM.
B. The Nature of Capital & A Critique French Socialism
1. Contradiction between Capital and Labour
Labour is the real source of wealth. This is the principle of classical political economy and its starting point. Therefore the workers are the rich and the non-workers (capitalists) the poor. On the contrary, however, the workers are the poor and the non-workers are actually the rich. A. Smith did not see any contradiction between his principle and his theoretical results and, on the other hand, he describes the miserable situations of the working class. Faced with the misery of the workers, the French socialists support labour and give labour everything.
Political economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, and to private property everything. Confronting this contradiction, Proudhon has decided in favour of labour against private property (3 MEC).
Proudhon's What is Private Property? (1841) and Philosophy
of Misery (1846) represent his critique of political
economy. He criticises economic categories from his
standpoint of 'equality' and tries to show that all
products would be exchanged according to an equal 'value'.
For him economic categories are not scientific reflections
of capitalistic production relations. He thinks that
he can change the situation only by replacing the present
mode of exchange with 'equal' exchange, without the
abolition of the capitalist mode of production itself.
Political economy is not directly responsible for
the misery of the workers. It is a necessary result
of the alienation of their labour-power, i.e. the only
source of all wealth, to the capitalists. What political
economists did was to analyse the real movement of
capital (production and consumption) scientificallyand
formulate it as laws (3 MEC 270 and 280). Thus Marx
criticises Proudhon by saying:
We understand, however, that this apparent contradiction is the contradiction of estranged labour with itself, and that political economy has merely formulated the laws of estranged labour (3 MEC 280).
From Marx's viewpoint, Proudhon does not understand the 'nature of capital' and its positive aspect at all. Without capital, neither modern civilisation nor the political emancipation of man is possible. Incidentally, Marx's critique of Proudhon's 'equality' is very interesting as well as important to understand Marx's socialism. According to Marx, 'equality is man's consciousnessof himself in the element of practice, i.e. man's consciousness of other men as his equals and man's attitude to other men as his equals' (4 MEC 39). Thus Proudhon is criticised by Marx in that 'Proudhon did not succeed in giving this thought appropriate development' (4 MEC 43). On the other hand, Marx characterised the communistic movement of production and consumption as 'social = human' in so-called 'Private Property and Communism' in [Third Manuscript] of EPM. The Holy Family (1845) explains the concept as follows:
Equality is the French expression for the unity of human essence, for man's consciousness of his species and his attitude towards his species, for the practical identity of man with man, i.e. for the social or human relation of man to man (4 MEC 39).
Marx's socialism as humanism is human intercourse in which men relate equally and to each other with products as an essential bond. It is the kind of social intercourse in which man realises his species-being.
2. Three Forms of Communism
Consequently Marx considers Proudhon to represent the
first and crudest form of communism. The second form
of communism is that which is 'still political in nature
democratic or despotic; with the abolition of the state,
yet still incomplete, and being still affected by
private property' (3 MEC 296). Marx criticised this
communism in that 'it has grasped its [private property's]
concept, but not its nature' (ibid.). This seems to
be 'a communist society . . . as it emerges from capitalist
society'[24] as far as it is mediated through the negation
of private property. Nevertheless the meaning of this
criticism is clear for us by now, as we have already
examined both the 'concept of private property' and
its 'nature'. It is not enough merely to abolish the
private property rights of capitalists. A new stage
of society, i.e. the positive abolition of modern
capitalist relations of production, must be the abolition
of 'estranged labour'. Thus Marx formulates his communism
as 'communism as the real appropriation of the human
essence by and for man' (3 MEC 296) or 'socialism as
socialism' (3 MEC 306), which does not require a negation
(such as despotic inroads on the right of private property)
any longer.
C. The Nature of Capital & A Critique
of Political Economy
1. The Limit of Classical Political Economy and Marx's Task
Political economy is not directly responsible for the misery of the worker. Its theoretical results could not be more cynical, the more it analyses the movement of present relations. 'There is a dis-proportionate growth in the cynicism of political economy from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc.', because 'their science develops more consistently and truthfully' (3 MEC 291). However, readers must understand that Marx does not agree with political economy completely, or rather, he shows us the limits of political economy here.I will do my best to illustrate Marx' critique of political economy in EPM.
2. Economic Laws as the Laws of Estranged Labour
Political economy derived its laws through an analysis of the movement of capital. It is, without any doubt, an aspect of scientism. It does not and cannot, however, 'comprehend these laws, i.e. it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property' (3 MEC 271). It cannot, because it does not grasp the 'nature of private property' fully. It is good of them to grasp 'labour (in general)' as the nature of capital. It sees wage-labour as the only 'natural', consequently, eternal form of labour, not as a historical form. This means that it cannot grasp the historical features of wage-labour, but only as the source of profit of capital. Just as Luther 'superseded external religiosity by making religiosity the inner substance of man', Smith superseded the 'external, mindless objectivity of wealth' (gold and silver of the mercantile system). As a result, however, just as 'man is brought within the orbit of religion' by Luther, man is brought within the orbit of wage- labour by Smith. It is no wonder that political economy is 'under the semblance of recognising man, the political economy whose principle is labour rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man' (3 MEC 291). This is the necessary result of its insufficiency in grasping the nature of capital. Marx writes:
Because they make private property in its active form the subject, thus simultaneously turning man into the nature and at the same time turning man as non-natural into the nature the contradiction of reality corresponds completely to the contradictory being which they accept as their principle (3 MEC 291-2).
Marx can easily explain that 'the apparent contradiction is the contradiction of estranged labour with itself, and political economy has merely formulated the laws of estranged labour' by grasping the nature of capital as 'estranged labour', a non- natural form of human labour. A similar statement appears in the Manuscripts of 1861-63 in the same context. Though lengthy I would like to quote his remark here to show that Marx is consistent from EPM to Capital.
In this contradiction, political economy merely expressed the nature of capitalist production or, if you like, of wage-labour, of labour alienated from itself, which stands confronted by the wealth it has created as alien wealth, by its won productive power as the productive power of its product, by its enrichment as its own impoverishment and by its social power as the power of society[25].
The main conclusion here is that Marx's starting point is where political economy ends its analysis, i.e. its limit. Although Marx could not complete his comprehension of economic laws as the laws of estranged labour, one thing is clear: he is at the right starting point in EPM by grasping estranged labour as the 'nature of capital'.
D. The Nature of Capital & A Critique of German Philosophy
1. A Critique of Hegel's Dialectic
'In the three years 1842-45 more was cleared away in
Germany than at other times in three centuries' (5
MEC 27). Feuerbach, in particular is 'the only one
who has at least made some progress and whose works
can be examined de bonne foi' (5 MEC 27-28) in the
field of critique of Hegelian dialectic. Marx counts
three great achievement of Feuerbach, including 1)
'The establishment of true materialism and of real
science, by making the social relationship of 'man
to man' the basic principle of the theory'; 2) 'His
opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims
to be the absolute positive, . . . positively based
on itself' (3 MEC 328).
As a matter of fact, the only social relationship
Feuerbach knows and recognises is at most friendship
and relationships between men; consequently he does
not criticise social relations in the Germany of his
day. Marx reads in Feuerbach that 'sense- perception
must be the basis of all science' (3 MEC 303) and human
history must be understood as starting from 'sense-
perception in the twofold form of sensuous consciousness
and sensuous need' (ibid.). Actually Marx sees the
'open book of man's essential powers' (3 MEC 302) in
the history of industry[26].
Thus Marx's critique of political economy should
not be understood as his political economy. It includes
so-called political economy, but it is wider ranging
than that. He expected it to be the complete human
science unifying natural and social sciences. Material
production and consumption are observed as the manifestation
of human life and 'appropriation for and by man of
the human nature' (3 MEC 299). Private property is
understood by Marx as 'only the perceptible expression
of the fact that man becomes objective for himself
and at the same time becomes to himself a strange
and inhuman object'. If capital is civilisation itself,
what workers are losing is not the products but civilisation.
The positive negation of private property should not
be conceived in the sense of immediate enjoyment but
also of the complete emancipation of all human senses
and qualities, in short the formation of 'a whole man'
(3 MEC 299).
2. Marx's Answer to 'The Twofold Proof'
Feuerbach, on the other hand, fails to match the outstanding achievement of Hegel's dialectic of negation, i.e. Hegel 'conceives the self-creation of man as a process' (3 MEC 332). In Hegelian philosophy objectification, estrangement and appropriation, in short everything, happens in pure thought. For example, when wealth and state power are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the human being, this only happens in their form as thoughts. Consequently, the appropriation of man's essential powers, which have become objects indeed, alien objects is in the first place only an appropriation occurring in consciousness, in pure thought[27]. Marx examines Hegel here:
Hegel . . . conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the nature of labour and comprehends objective man true, because real man as the outcome of man's own labour (3 MEC 332-33).
Marx presents Hegel's speculative dialectic of negation as 'the twofold proof' of private property. Let us investigate the matter for a while. Both 'division of labour and exchange', as Smith says, are specifically human activities. Animals are unable to combine differences in their attributes in the same species but not in different breeds. In this sense, division of labour and exchange show that human beings are community- beings and that each of them is the species-being. 'Division of labour' is 'the mutual completion and exchange of the activity itself' (3 MEC 220), and 'exchange' is the mutual completion of the products. Division of labour and exchange reveal the social character of human labour or the social labour. However, 'the unity of human labour' appears as 'division of labour', because its 'social nature only comes into existence as its opposite, in the form of estrangement' (3 MEC 220-221). The social character of labour does not appear directly and is not under the control of the individuals. The development of the division of labour and exchange represent the development of human social powers in estranged form. When they are carried out as the conscious activities of the members under their control, they are worth calling 'social' and 'human' activities.
Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and of human products against one another, is equivalent to species- activity and species-enjoyment[28], the real, conscious and true mode of existence of which is social activity and social enjoyment (3 MEC 216-7).
The division of labour is the economic expression of the social character of labour within the estrangement. Or rather, 'since labour is only an expression of human activity within alienation, . . . the division of labour, too, is therefore nothing but the estranged, alienated position of human activity as . . . activity of man as a species-being' (3 MEC 317). Division of labour and exchange are 'perceptibly alienated expression of human activity and essential power as a species activity and species of power' (3 MEC 321). These human activities can be realised as social powers of individuals and be reorganised as their own conscious activities, and only when they are universally produced by their own life activity. Truly social and human movement in production and consumption not only produces men and nature as social men and social nature but also requires social men and social nature as a starting point. In this very point lies the twofold proof of private property. Human beings needed it to develop their social powers, and now it should be put under the control of their conscious association.
Likewise, . . ., both the material of labour and man
as the subject, are the point of departure as well
as the result of the movement (and precisely in this
fact, that they must constitute the point of departure,
lies the historical necessity of private property).
Thus the social character is the general character
of the whole movement' (3 MEC 298).
Precisely in the fact that division of labour and exchange
are aspects of private property lies the twofold proof,
on the one hand that human life required private property
for its realisation, and on the other hand that it
now requires the supersession of private property (3
MEC 321).
Marx can see this result through his analysis of the 'nature of capital' (estranged labour). Thus it is natural that Soviet Marxism and its followers who deny EPM cannot see that. They have nothing to do with Marx in Grundrisse, in Notes on James Mill and in EPM.
Equally certain is it that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social interconnections before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing). This bond is their product. It is a historical product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development (Grundrisse, Pelican ed., p.161-62).
'Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal [gemeinschaftlich] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control' (ibid., p.162) and are the product of social production and social consumption. Communism as the negation of the negation is nothing more than the basis for this movement.
Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society (3 MEC 306).
V. Conclusion
We started our investigation of Marx's communism
with dis- similarities between Anti and Capital,
i.e. the concepts of 'individual property', 'social
property', the 'realm of necessity' and the 'realm
of freedom'. When we examine the sourses of those
dissimilarities, we uncovered dissimilarities in
the concepts 'appropriation' and thus 'appropriation
of productive forces'.
Marx means by 'appropriation' the relationship
of labour to its natural conditions, or production.
As productive forces lie only in the relations
of individuals, he means by 'appropriation of productive
forces' the reorganisation of the social intercourse
of men into conscious activity as human beings.
'Social = human' is used as the real existence
of species-beings. Engels, on the other hand, understands
by 'appropriation' taking over products as means
of production or consumption. Thus he interprets the
'appropriation of productive forces' as taking
over the means of production. Consequently, his
communism is 'community of property' and lacks the
content in terms of cooperation and free intercourse
amongst workers, which is the basis of the universal
development of individuals. In his concept of 'social
property' the popularisation and the vulgarisation
of Marx's communism is openly declared.
So-called existing socialism is the vulgarlisation
of Engels' communism, i.e. 'crude communism' or
the 'state capitalism' in EPM. It is not the proletariat
who appropriated political power and control over production,
but the Communist Party. The concept 'private property'
advanced by some reformists during Perestroika,
e.g. by Pavel Bunichy, is more like Marx's 'common
property' than 'capitalist private property',
but less like 'individual property'. This also
means that even the best and the brightest of Soviet
Marxists cannot understand Marx's 'individual and
social property' at all. They might have grasped
and done away with the 'concept of private property'
but cannot grasp the 'nature of private property',
not to mention its abolition. Estranged labour
must have been at its zenith there. The collapse
of existing socialism proves its theoretical deficiencies
and of its followers in western countries. However,
Marx's communism, in his own words, still indicates
the way to more human social relations. What is
needed in existing socialism is not only liberalisation
of capital and of its economy, but of the mode of
workers' cooperation in the production process and
in their social intercourse.
In modern capitalist society, on the other hand,
what is needed, is an understanding that the immense
productive power of capital is our own social power
and that we are producing the basis of universal
individuality by producing the civilising power
of capital. The problem is that very few understand
the connection of Marx's theories to the 'nature of
capital'.
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[1]. I need not remind readers that this paper suggests indirectly what should be done away with in modern capitailism and 'existing socialism' in China, another daughter of Soviet Marxism.
[2]. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875)
Marx distinguished 'a communist society . . . just
as it emerges from capitalist society' (24 MEC 85)
from 'a communist society . . . as it has developed
on its own foundations' (ebd.). Lenin termed
these 'socialism' and 'communism'.
Although these are widely accepted, I do not follow
this terminology here, but rather Marx's in EPM
where 'socialism as socialism' is taken to be higher
than 'communism' which requires the negation of
private property.
Engels called himself a communist to distinguish
himself from the French reformists known as 'socialists'
in the 1840s. However, as far as Marx is concerned,
communism and socialism as used here, have the same
meaning.
[3]. Also Marx's Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and the Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston (edited and with introduction and notes by Lester Hutchinson, 1969, Lawrence & Wishart, London) is included.
[4]. Engels adds 'trust' to these in his Socialsim:
Utopian and
Scientific (1891). See Marx-Engels Selected Works in
one volume (Lawrence & Wishart, London), p.421.
[5]. Engels uses the term 'in the hands of the producers
working together' once in the present version of Anti
(25 MEC 267). This is a supplement to the Fourth
Edition of his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.
To be fair, Marx actually writes 'in the hands of
the State' in The Communist Manifesto. However,
the 'State' here is equivalent to the 'individuals',
because he
explains it as 'i.e. of the proletariat organised
as the ruling class' (6 MEC 504).
[6]. Marx wrote the First and Second German Edition and the French version of Capital. The reason why I quote the Second German Edition of Capital here is that the underlined sentences are modified in the present German and the English editions.
[7]. Capital I, Pelican ed., p.283.
[8]. Ibid., p.284.
[9]. Ibid., p.285.
[10]. Ibid., p.290.
[11]. See also 3 MEC 276-7.
[12]. Capital I, Pelican ed., p.447.
[13]. Ibid., p.424.
[14]. Kunihiko Uemura asserts that Marx's concepts
'association', 'individual property', etc. were pioneered
by Adolf Schurz. In Schurz, however, 'individual
property' is based on the very low stage of German
industries in the 1840's and an 'association' of
workers is not the positive avolition of 'the nature
of capital' at all. On the other hand, Marx's 'association'
is to be based on the cooperation was which developed
to the extreme by capital and is equivalent to the
positive abolition of 'the nature of capital'. In
this sense, for Marx, Shurz is an utopian socialist
rather than a pioneer. Marx writes in EPM:
Association, applied to land, shares the economic
advantage of large-scale landed property, and
first brings to realisation the original tendency
inherent in [land] division, namely, equality (3
MEC 268).
[15]. Capital I, Pelican ed., p.171.
[16]. Ibid., p.166.
[17]. See Marx's critique of the 'community of women' (3 MEC 294 and 6 MEC 502).
[18]. MEGA2, II-2, S.54. See also 3 MEC 298 and 312-313.
[19]. Equality between the sexes and between the labours are the basis for this. See the section "[C] VIII POSITIVE ASPECT OF WAGE LABOUR" of Wages (1847):
Secondly: the halo of sanctity is entirely gone from
all relationships of the old society, since they
have been resolved into pure money relationships.
Likewise, all so-called higher kinds of labour,
intellectual, artistic, etc., have been turned into
articles of commerce and have thereby lost their old
sanctity (6 MEC 436. See 3 MEC 285-8).
Marx's communism, as the reorganisation of man's relation
to nature and to other men, is a critique of Christianity.
[20]. See 'two questions' (3 MEC 241). These two questions
are answered 'on the basis of the above exposition,
which has been presented almost in the words of
the political economists' in the quotations which
follow. See 'two other problems' (3 MEC 281). The
way in which the "First Manuscript" ends
does
suggest that Marx tries to solve those problems through
an analysis of the 'property relation of capitalist'
in the "Second Manuscript". See the
'distinction between . . . immovable and movable
private property' (3 MEC 285-9) which shows the
'necessary victory of the capitalists over the
landowners' (3 MEC 288). See 'the movement through
which these constituents [labour and capital] have
to pass' (3 MEC 289). See 'the antithesis between
lack of property and property' (3 MEC 293-4). See also
the 'examination of division of labour and exchange'
(3 MEC 321).
[21]. Compare Marx's notes in Notes on Say with Say's original text (MEGA2, IV-2, SS.316-9). Marx's 'private property' is Say's 'right of private property'. In other words, Marx is explaining the genesis of the 'right of private property'.
[22]. The following section "3. THE RULE OF CAPITAL OVER LABOUR AND THE MOTIVES OF THE CAPITALIST" has nothing but quotations from Smith and Say. However, we can understand Marx's intention in the section through the quotations, i.e. 'the plans and speculations of the employers of capital regulates and direct all the most important operations of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and projects' (3 MEC 250).
[23]. MEGA2, II-3, S.1433. Theories of Surplus Value, III, Progress Publishers, p.297 and p.306.
[24]. David McLellan, Karl Marx Selected Writings, Oxford. p.568.
[25]. MEGA2, II-3, S.1389. Theories of Surplus Value, III, Progress Publishers, p.259.
[26]. Engels misleadingly named this the 'material interpretation of history'. Marx himself, on the other hand, calls this in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy (1859) 'the general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my study.' I would like to examine this dissimilarity in the near future. The point is in rereading it as Marx's method of his system (a critique of political economy).
[27]. Marx writes that 'Hegel's standpoint is that of
modern political economy' (3 MEC 333). Because the
only labour Hegel knows and recognises is the present
form of labour (wage labour) and he does not see
it as estranged labour. Unless the estranged labour
is abolished Hegel's real man does not
come out through human labour.
[28]. The text used to be read as 'species-spirit' but is officially corrected as 'species-enjoyment' as pointed out by Suguru Hosomi. See the following sentence in the quotation and other similar sentences (3 MEC 298 and 333).